By Marcos Alan Ferreira

Marcos Alan Ferreira is an Associate Professor of International Relations at the Federal University of Paraíba (UFPB, Brazil) and a Visiting Scholar at the University of Sheffield (UK) (2026–2027). His work focuses on peace research by analyzing how criminal dynamics and state violence affect social peace in Latin America. His current projects also examine youth conceptualizations of peace and conflict, exploring their roles in local peacebuilding efforts.

Forty years ago, the Universal House of Justice addressed the peoples of the world in a statement of notable moral clarity entitled The Promise of World Peace. Released in October 1985, it was transmitted to heads of state and governments across the globe and translated into dozens of languages. It was not a diplomatic communiqué or a policy brief, but rather a document that the Universal House of Justice itself described as a message directed to all of humanity at a moment when the question of peace had become a vital issue confronting humanity.1The Promise of World Peace, bahai.org/r/883867984.

The historical moment in which the message was produced was one of division, but also of a certain degree of hope. The Cold War continued to divide the world between two nuclear-armed superpowers, while proxy conflicts raged across Central America, Southern Africa, and Southeast Asia. In the span of just a few decades, the international community had witnessed both the founding of the United Nations and the repeated frustration of its promise to build a less violent global order. The prevailing mood was thus one of heightened danger combined with an emerging global consciousness in a growing sense that humanity could not continue along its present path without catastrophic consequences, and that it therefore needed to reflect on fundamental moral choices.

Four decades later, the world has changed in ways both expected and surprising. The Cold War ended, bringing with it a brief wave of euphoric hope for a new global order in the 1990s. That hope gradually receded with the rise of terrorism, transnational organized crime, and, more recently, the intense return of interstate conflicts affecting societies in Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Running alongside these ills has been the steady growth of inequality in its most extreme forms, even as absolute poverty has declined in some populated regions like China and Brazil. What has followed is, in many respects, a recurrence of familiar pathologies in new forms: nationalism is again gaining momentum, multilateral institutions are under increasing stress, and the normalization of violence in public discourse—political, digital, and armed—has reached levels that would have alarmed even the most pessimistic observers of 1985.

This is precisely why returning to The Promise of World Peace is not an exercise in nostalgia or institutional self-celebration. Rather, it reflects an effort to engage seriously with a message that anticipated, with notable clarity, the structural conditions that continue to obstruct the progress of peace. More than that, it articulated a conceptual framework that remains relevant to challenges that secular social science has yet to fully address, grounded in the oneness of humanity, the transformation of character, and the moral prerequisites for collective security.

The main argument of this article is that the preconditions for peace identified in 1985 still have not been met. These conditions are based on the recognition of human oneness and a transformation of collective assumptions about human nature, and they are increasingly relevant in a world of rising nationalism, structural violence, and fragmented global governance. To develop this argument, this article starts by comparing the world of 1985 and now and follows examining the foundational principle of human oneness. Then, it discusses the challenges posed by the culture of violence and reflects on institutional limitations. The analysis concludes by considering the implications of the 2019 message of the Universal House of Justice,2Universal House of Justice to the Bahá’ís of the world, 18 January 2019, bahai.org/r/276724432. which expanded and deepened the 1985 framework presented in The Promise of World Peace.

Historical photos of The Promise of World Peace document being presented to various world leaders.
The Promise of World Peace was presented to over 130 world leaders by 1986, including (L to R) the Dalai Lama of Tibet, the President of the United States, the President of Peru, the Head of State of Uganda, and the Secretary General of the United Nations.

A WORLD ON THE BRINK, THEN AND NOW

The Promise of World Peace was issued into a world living under the shadow of nuclear annihilation. The arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union had reached levels of destructive capacity that made mutual annihilation not merely possible but, under certain plausible scenarios, virtually automatic. Shoghi Effendi had earlier described the forces of the age as both disintegrative and integrative, pulling humanity simultaneously toward fragmentation and toward an emergent global consciousness.3The World Order of Bahá’u’lláh, bahai.org/r/536052373. The 1985 message addressed precisely that dual dynamic, insisting that the integrative forces were not incidental but constitutive of a genuine historical trajectory toward peace.

The structural parallels with our present moment are impossible to ignore. The twenty-first century has produced a reconfiguration of geopolitical risk that mirrors, in many respects, the multipolar instabilities of the pre-1945 order. The erosion of the liberal international order, expressed in the weakening of multilateral institutions, the rise of nationalist populism across both hemispheres, and the breakdown of shared epistemic frameworks that once made diplomacy possible, now recalls the fractured world the 1985 statement sought to address. The Universal House of Justice observed in 2019 that “many of the dominant currents in societies everywhere are pushing people apart, not drawing them together” and that “the forces of disintegration regroup and gain ground.”418 January 2019, bahai.org/r/963030050. The intervening decades have not resolved the tensions of 1985; they have, in many ways, intensified them.

Inequality, another structural precondition of violence that the document identified, remains persistent. The global economy has delivered unprecedented aggregate wealth while simultaneously concentrating it in ways clearly recognized as incompatible with peace. Political and economic systems have enabled the enrichment of small circles with conspicuously excessive wealth, a condition the 2019 message described as one that “fuels fundamental instability in world affairs.”518 January 2019, bahai.org/r/963030050. This is not merely a matter of economic injustice, critical as that is; it is also a generator of the structural violence that peace researchers have long identified as an obstacle to positive peace.6Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 167–191, jstor.org/stable/422690. In other words, it is under conditions of inequality that certain populations become more exposed to a form of violence that does not necessarily kill outright but nevertheless produces hunger, precarious living conditions, and a systematic denial of human dignity.

The ecological dimension of peace, the recognition that no lasting social order can be built on the destruction of the planetary commons, was not yet clearly visible in 1985. Subsequently, the Bahá’í International Community has helped to reflect on this very question, as illustrated by its contributions to the COP30 conference in Belém, Brazil. There, representatives emphasized that the climate crisis is not merely a technical or economic challenge but a profoundly ethical and spiritual one, calling for a sense of shared responsibility across generations. 

Yet amid this constellation of challenges, the core insight of The Promise of World Peace remains as clarifying as ever. Peace is not primarily a set of policies or treaties. It is a social and moral process grounded in the recognition of shared humanity. The Universal House of Justice understood that the instruments of peace, including international institutions, arms agreements, and diplomatic frameworks, are necessary but not sufficient. They require a corresponding transformation in human consciousness and in the structures that shape it. This is the dimension that has remained most underdeveloped, and it is also where the document’s contribution has been most consistently underestimated.

PRECONDITIONS FOR PEACE: THE ONENESS OF HUMANITY AS FOUNDATION 

The conceptual heart of The Promise of World Peace is a claim both simple and radical: that a just world order “can be founded only on an unshakable consciousness of the oneness of mankind.”7Promise of World Peace, bahai.org/r/674456093. This is not a rhetorical flourish, but rather a concept presented as the organizing principle from which all other prerequisites for peace derive. The recognition of human oneness is presented not as a sentiment but as an ontological reality, one whose acknowledgment or denial has material consequences for the structures of society.

The principle is demanding in its implications. The document does not present it as an invitation to vague cosmopolitan benevolence; rather, it is a call to reorganize political, economic, and social structures in accordance with the recognition that every human being belongs, in the deepest sense, to a single community. Ultimately, our primary identity resides in the recognition that we are human beings, fruit of a single tree, and that elements of identity such as race, class, and gender, are secondary.

This means confronting the social ills that affect the recognition of the other as part of a single whole. One example is the need to overcome racism, which can be seen not as a regrettable social attitude but as a structural ordering of privilege and deprivation incompatible with peace, given it impairs one’s ability to recognize the other as part of the same humanity. It equally means pursuing the full emancipation of women not as a concession to equity but as a precondition for the maturation of civilization. It means rethinking national sovereignty in ways that make genuine collective security possible, setting aside the self that belongs to a single country and making room for a self connected to the world. And it means transcending the causes of religious strife by recognizing the underlying unity of the world’s great religious traditions.

It is striking to note that since the 1950s, the academic field of peace studies has arrived, through a different route, at overlapping conclusions. The field recognizes that the overcoming of violence in all its forms is a central factor for peace, for it allows us to affirm that no human being should have their dignity violated, whether by direct or indirect violence. Johan Galtung’s foundational work on structural violence established that peace cannot be reduced to the absence of armed conflict, since inequality, discrimination, and the systematic denial of human potential are themselves forms of violence.8“Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” jstor.org/stable/422690. The field developed a conceptually rich vocabulary: negative peace, understood as the absence of direct violence, and positive peace, understood as the presence of conditions that enable human flourishing. Since then, peace studies has increasingly recognized that positive peace requires structural transformation, not merely conflict management.9David P. Barash and Charles P. Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies (SAGE, 2002).

Text graphic of the concepts of violence and peace, created by Johan Galtung
The Extended Concepts of Violence and Peace by Johan Galtung

The Promise of World Peace arrives at a remarkably consonant position from a different epistemological starting point: one grounded in the spiritual reality of human oneness rather than in the empirical measurement of social inequality. What the 1985 message adds, which complements the development of peace studies, is a more explicit emphasis on the motivational foundations of structural transformation. Academic peace research is able to describe cultural and structural violence with precision, and it shares with the Bahá’í statement the same essential foundation: the recognition of the inherent dignity of every human being. Both frameworks ultimately call for the construction of lasting peace on the basis of unconditional respect for the humanity we share.10 Marcos Alana Ferreira, “Peace in Perspective: The Historical Development of Peace Studies and the Bahá’í Concept,” Journal of the Sociology and Theory of Religion 13 (2022): 297–321, doi.org/10.24197/jstr.1.2022.297-321.

Yet the statement devotes particular attention to a question that peace studies has explored more gradually: why would human beings choose to undertake the sacrifices that genuine structural transformation requires? Why would the recognition of shared humanity become not merely an intellectual position but a lived commitment? To answer these questions, one can reflect that this motivational problem cannot be resolved without engaging the spiritual dimension of human life. The reality that human beings have capacities for altruism, justice, and solidarity that are as authentically constitutive of human nature as the competitive and acquisitive instincts that dominant social theories have tended to emphasize.11Marcos Alan Ferreira and Michael Karlberg,“Bahá’í Faith,” in The SAGE Encyclopedia of War: Social Science Perspectives, ed. by Paul Joseph (SAGE, 2017), 131–133.

This argument resonates with a growing body of work in social psychology and behavioral economics that has challenged the assumption of universal self-interest as the basis of human motivation.12Kristen Renwick Monroe, The Heart of Altruism: Perceptions of a Common Humanity (Princeton University Press, 1996). But the document’s claim goes further when it places the development of altruistic capacities in an educational process grounded in spiritual values such as love, justice, generosity, and truthfulness, values that are not reducible to social incentives. In the statement’s own words, “the courage, the resolution, the pure motive, the selfless love of one people for another — all the spiritual and moral qualities required for effecting this momentous step towards peace are focused on the will to act.”13Promise of World Peace, bahai.org/r/347891062. In this respect, The Promise of World Peace anticipates a turn in peace studies scholarship that has recently begun to take seriously the role of moral and spiritual formation in the construction of peace.14 John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace (Oxford University Press, 2005).

Contemporary manifestations of the identity politics the document warned against have made this analysis more, not less, relevant. The 2019 letter described how countless permutations of “us” and “them” define group identities in ever-narrowing opposition. The fragmentation of public discourse along lines of ethnicity, nation, religion, class, and ideology reflects precisely the structural breakdown of shared identity that the 1985 statement diagnosed. The prescription remains the same. The document is explicit that diversity is a source of richness rather than a problem, so the goal is not the erasure of difference. What is required instead is the recognition of a shared humanity that is prior to and more fundamental than any of the partial identities that divide us.

DECONSTRUCTING A CULTURE OF VIOLENCE

As briefly presented above, one of the most intellectually distinctive contributions of The Promise of World Peace is its challenge to the conception of human nature that underlies most modern social institutions. The document explicitly rejects the view that human beings are “incorrigibly selfish and aggressive,” locating the persistence of violence not in an immutable human nature but in distorted social conditions and entrenched assumptions that have shaped institutional life.15Promise of World Peace, bahai.org/r/844922602. This claim converges with the Bahá’í conception of human nature as characterized by dual capacities for egoism and altruism, competition and cooperation—and the extent to which either develops is a function of education, cultural environment, and will.16Ferreira and Karlberg,“Bahá’í Faith.”

The significance of this claim extends beyond its contribution to peace theory. It has direct implications for how we understand and address what has come to be called the culture of violence—the normalization of violent behavior, violent discourse, and violent social arrangements as features of ordinary life rather than exceptional pathologies. A culture of violence is not sustained by individual moral failure alone, but it is reproduced through institutional structures, educational systems, media environments, and the implicit values encoded in economic and political life.17Johan Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” Journal of Peace Research 27, no. 3 (1990): 291–305. The 1985 document grasped this dynamic clearly, understanding courage, resolution, and selfless love as mighty forces in the establishment of peace that must be cultivated through sustained social processes, not assumed as natural givens.

Brazilian social reality offers a pointed illustration of how deeply embedded the culture of violence can be. The colonial foundations of Brazilian society established a hierarchy of violence—especially against indigenous peoples, enslaved Africans, and women—that has been reconstituted in different institutional forms across the centuries. Current data on femicide, on police lethality directed disproportionately at black Brazilians, and on the political mobilization of authoritarian discourse reveal the continuing force of structural and cultural violence in a society that has also, paradoxically, produced some of the world’s most creative experiments in community peacebuilding.18 Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, Anuário Brasileiro de Segurança Pública 2024 (FBSP, 2024). This paradox is not unique to Brazil; it is a condition of the transitional age the document described and can be seen in other societies in different continents.

Rows of attendees of a forum in the Chamber of Deputies in Brazil sit at long tables in front of computer screens.
A commemorative hearing in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies, marking the 40th anniversary of The Promise of World Peace

The connection between the framework delineated in the statement of the Universal House of Justice and contemporary scholarship on deconstructing cultures of violence is instructive. Galtung’s concept of cultural violence provides a useful vocabulary for what the document diagnoses. By cultural violence, Galtung means those aspects of the symbolic sphere of our existence, including religion, ideology, language, and art, that serve to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence.19Galtung, “Cultural Violence.” The Promise of World Peace identifies specific barriers that operate in this cultural sphere: racism, unbridled nationalism, religious strife, and the denial of women’s full equality. These are not merely regrettable attitudes but deep-seated cultural legitimizations of conflict. Yet the document’s response to this diagnosis is not primarily legislative or punitive. Instead, it is educational and spiritual. The transformation of consciousness, grounded in the recognition of the oneness of mankind and mediated through consultative action, constitutes the primary instrument of change. Thus, world order can be founded “only on an unshakable consciousness of the oneness of mankind,”20Promise of World Peace, bahai.org/r/674456093. a spiritual truth which all the human sciences confirm.

This is a point where the Bahá’í framework enriches rather than simply replicates the peace studies tradition. Peace research has developed sophisticated analyses of the causes of violence and proposed a range of institutional remedies. What it has engaged more tentatively is the question of how values change and how the moral imagination of communities can be transformed in ways that make alternative social arrangements not only theoretically conceivable but practically realizable.21Lederach, The Moral Imagination. The mode of operation of the Bahá’í community since the 1996 message—focused on the spiritual education of children and youth, on devotional and reflective community life, and on the constructive engagement of all institutions of society in the cultivation of peaceful values—suggests a program for moral and cultural transformation irreducible to policy reform alone, as is often suggested by institutionalist approaches to peace.22 Barash and Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies.

INSTITUTIONS, STRUCTURES, AND THE MORAL PRECONDITIONS OF PEACE 

The Promise of World Peace is notable for the care with which it distinguishes between the practical instruments of peace—arms agreements, international institutions, legal frameworks—and the deeper structural and moral prerequisites without which those instruments cannot function. The document acknowledges the importance of a world authority adequate to ensure peace, and it endorses the principle of collective security that Bahá’u’lláh first articulated in the nineteenth century. But it insists with clarity that treaties and institutions are not self-executing. Actually, they depend for their effectiveness on the degree to which they are grounded in genuine, shared commitments and on the moral quality of the human beings and communities that sustain them.

This insight has been vindicated repeatedly by the history of international institutions since 1985. The United Nations, the most ambitious experiment in collective security yet attempted, has made real contributions to international stability. These contributions have been consistently supported and encouraged by the Bahá’í community, while also calling for the deep structural reforms that would allow the UN system to advance peace in a more just and functional manner.23Ferreira and Karlberg,“Bahá’í Faith.” But the UN’s limitations have been equally visible. It has been unable to prevent the resurgence of great power competition, the erosion of multilateral norms, or the instrumentalization of humanitarian language for purposes of national interest. The repeated paralysis of the Security Council has shown with painful clarity that institutional architecture alone is insufficient when it lacks corresponding political will. And that political will is itself a function of deeper moral and social conditions.

The document’s observation that statesmen of the world were faced with a crisis unprecedented in human history remains accurate in 2025, though the crisis has multiplied and intensified. The proliferation of non-state armed actors, the weaponization of information technology, the global ecological crisis, and democratic backsliding visible across multiple regions have added dimensions that the 1985 statement could not have fully anticipated. But the document’s core diagnosis retains its explanatory force. The international order is structurally inadequate because it has not been built on the recognition of the oneness of humanity as a prerequisite for a peaceful international order.

The Universal House of Justice’s 2019 message elaborated this institutional analysis in ways faithful to the 1985 framework while responsive to intervening developments. It observed that the forces of disintegration, including the resurgence of racism, nationalism, and partisanship, had undermined the willingness “to engage in international collective action” that had once “represented a powerful strain of thinking among world leaders.”24 18 January 2019, bahai.org/r/963030050. This regression, the message argued, was not permanent; but, it acknowledged with characteristic realism, the path to unity might be tortuous and the world might face further suffering before the necessity of a genuine new order became inescapable.

The implication for those committed to peace is not passivity but a clear-eyed understanding of where the leverage points for change actually lie. Institutions fail when they are not grounded in shared moral commitments. Therefore, the cultivation of those commitments through education, community life, public discourse, and constructive action is not a secondary activity that can await institutional reform. It is the precondition for institutional reform. In this sense, the promotion of peace is fundamentally a work of culture. It means changing what communities value, what they celebrate, what they teach their children, and what they regard as the non-negotiable commitments of shared life. This is a work that must take place at multiple levels, from the local to the international, and it must resonate with values that can overcome the different forms of violence that impact peace.

LESSONS FROM 2019 AND BEYOND: TOWARD A PRACTICE OF PEACE 

The Universal House of Justice’s letter of January 2019, addressed to Bahá’ís around the world on the occasion of the centenary of the Paris Peace Conference, offered a sustained reflection on the state of the peace project and on the continuing responsibilities of those committed to it. It did not supersede The Promise of World Peace; it deepened it, taking into account the current affairs of the world. And in doing so, it shifted the emphasis in ways instructive for understanding what a practice of peace might look like in the present moment.

The 2019 message drew attention to the Bahá’í community’s four-decade project of patiently refining the social model implied by the 1985 statement, building and expanding a system of social organization based on Bahá’u’lláh’s teachings. Unlike the 1985 statement, which was primarily diagnostic and prescriptive, the 2019 letter showed that those conditions were not merely being advocated for but were being enacted through a learning process in communities that raise children without the contamination of racial or national prejudice, that pursue the full equality of women and men, that welcome the followers of every faith and of none to their devotional gatherings, and that develop the capacity to engage those around them, regardless of creed, culture, class, or ethnicity, in conversations about how to realize both the spiritual and material well-being of their communities.

This emphasis on community building as a contribution to peace is not merely a Bahá’í institutional claim; it reflects a growing recognition in peace scholarship that the construction of positive peace is a grassroots process that cannot be imposed from above or achieved through elite negotiation alone. John Paul Lederach’s work on peace practice has argued, with considerable empirical support, that sustainable peace requires the cultivation of moral imagination—the capacity of communities to envision and enact relationships that transcend the cycles of violence in which they are embedded.25Lederach, The Moral Imagination. Elise M. Boulding’s vision of a culture of peace similarly emphasized the primacy of everyday social relationships, family life, community bonds, and the practices of mutual care and respect in building the foundations of a peaceful world.26Cultures of Peace: The Hidden Side of History (Syracuse University Press, 2000). The Bahá’í understanding of peace as, in the first instance, an accomplishment of individuals and communities with institutions playing a supporting rather than a determining role, aligns with and enriches this tradition developed by scholars like Boulding and Lederach.

The 2019 message also underscored the importance of contributing to the discourses of society. This means Bahá’í individuals and communities engaging in the intellectual, cultural, and civic conversations that shape how societies understand themselves and their possibilities. Peace is not only built in communities. It is also advocated, narrated, and imagined. This engagement with narratives is itself a form of peace work. It determines what counts as normal, what counts as possible, and whose experiences are rendered visible. Organizations engaged in the deconstruction of violence in contexts like Brazil have recognized this dynamic. For example, they have learned that the battle for the narrative of public security is as important as any programmatic intervention. Hegemonic discourses of fear and force must be contested through the construction of alternative narratives grounded in hope, justice, and the dignity of local communities.27 Office of External Affairs of the Bahá’ís of Brazil, “Síntese da Coalizão Desconstrução da Violência” (2026); unpublished document circulated among civil society engaged in peace discourse.

The 2019 letter’s emphasis on youth is similarly worth dwelling on. Young people distinguished by their commitment to a society built on peace and justice and their engagement in the work of building communities on that foundation are not merely a rhetorical constituency; they are the primary vehicle through which the transformation of culture across generations is achieved. The systematic cultivation of moral and spiritual capacities in children and adolescents is among the most consequential forms of peace work available to communities. This cultivation happens through educational processes that develop not only cognitive skills but also the virtues of truthfulness, empathy, justice, and solidarity.28 Ferreira, “Peace in Perspective,” doi.org/10.24197/jstr.1.2022.297-321.

Community-building efforts around the world, guided by the principle of humanity’s oneness, aim to contribute to spiritual and material advancement.

THE PROMISE, STILL A PROJECT 

The Promise of World Peace is now forty years old. Yet it continues to speak to concrete needs in today’s world. It speaks to the need to deconstruct violence and to build peace. The document understood that peace is a social and moral achievement, not merely a diplomatic arrangement. It understood that the structures of violence are reproduced through the values embedded in institutions, education systems, and cultural life. Transforming those structures requires attending to the moral and spiritual formation of persons and communities. And it understood that the recognition of the oneness of humanity is not a sentiment but an organizing principle with practical implications for every domain of social life.

What has changed in forty years is not the validity of these insights but the urgency with which they apply. The resurgence of nationalism, the intensification of structural inequality, the weaponization of digital information environments, the ecological crisis, and the persistent normalization of violence in politics and public life have made the document’s diagnosis more, not less, accurate. The questions posed in 1985 remain unanswered. Humanity must decide whether it will build a world order that reflects its deep interdependence and the spiritual reality of its oneness.

For peace researchers, the document offers resources that bring into focus an element still underexplored in much of the field: the importance of moral and spiritual values that cultivate peace, not merely institutional designs. It presents an account of human nature as genuinely dual, capable of both egoism and altruism—and the latter’s need to be developed for a peaceful society. It offers a conception of the motivational foundations of peace that takes seriously the spiritual dimension of human experience. And it provides a model of community life as a site of moral and cultural transformation rather than merely a setting for institutional interventions. For communities conmmitted to peace work, the document offers something more immediate: the conviction that every act of building genuine human solidarity in families, neighborhoods, schools, and civic associations is a contribution to a historical process whose trajectory is, for all its tortuousness, ultimately assured.

Four decades after it was written, The Promise of World Peace remains what it was in 1985: not a prediction of how peace will come, but a map of what it will require. The work of realizing that promise is the work of our generation.

By Wendy M. Heller

Wendy M. Heller has published articles on Bahá’í topics and a biography of Lidia Zamenhof and was editor of The Journal of Bahá’í Studies for six years. Most recently she contributed a chapter to The World of the Bahá’í Faith (Routledge, 2022).

    And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you do not know?
    —Plato, Meno

Knowledge is valuable, but the knowledge that is prized above all, and which Aristotle called the “most perfect” of its modes, is wisdom.1Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham (Harvard University Press, 1956), 343. Its worth, King Solomon himself tells us, is beyond rubies; when compared to wisdom, all the gold in the world is nothing but sand.2Proverbs 8:11; Wisdom 7:9. Yet, like gold and rubies, wisdom is rare, which accounts for its paradoxical aspect: as exemplified in the archetypal example of wisdom, the Judgment of Solomon, recounted in 1 Kings 3:16–28, it can seem completely incomprehensible—eluding ordinary understanding and resisting the analysis of reason.

Wisdom has always figured prominently in religious scriptures, and it is a frequent theme in the Sacred Texts of the Bahá’í Faith. In 1889 the Founder of the religion, Bahá’u’lláh, then confined as a religious prisoner of the Ottoman Empire in the prison city of ‘Akká, wrote a Tablet titled “Words of Paradise” (Kalimát-i-Firdawsíyyih), in which He extolled wisdom as

the greatest gift and the most wondrous blessing…. It is man’s unfailing Protector. It aideth him and strengtheneth him. Wisdom is God’s Emissary and the Revealer of His Name the Omniscient. Through it the loftiness of man’s station is made manifest and evident. It is all-knowing and the foremost Teacher in the school of existence. It is the Guide and is invested with high distinction. Thanks to its educating influence earthly beings have become imbued with a gem-like spirit which outshineth the heavens.3Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets of Bahá’u’lláh Revealed after the Kitáb-i-Aqdas (Bahá’í World Centre, 1978), 6.24, bahai.org/r/030537471.

‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Bahá’u’lláh’s son and successor as Head of the Bahá’í Faith, and the authorized Interpreter of His Writings, commented on the inscrutable quality of wisdom in a table talk published in 1908 in the collection titled Some Answered Questions: “How often has it happened that a wise, accomplished, and sagacious person took a course of action, and those who were incapable of grasping its wisdom objected and questioned why he said or did thus. This objection is prompted by ignorance, and the wisdom of that wise man is free and sanctified from error.”4‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions (Bahá’í World Centre, 2014), 45.6, bahai.org/r/610118851. On another occasion He advised the Bahá’ís, “Know that in every movement of ‘Abdu’l Bahá, in every word He uttereth, there lieth a great wisdom. If what He doeth appeareth to be strange, this is because the wisdom is not known to the friends.”5‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Extract from a Tablet, Bahá’í Reference Library, bahai.org/r/989684892.

TWO ASPECTS OF WISDOM

In recent decades, the study of wisdom—what it is and how to get more of it—has seen a revival of interest in fields including ethics, philosophy, psychology, education, and organizational studies. In both Eastern and Western traditions, wisdom includes knowledge of the fundamental truths of the reality of things as well as how to use that knowledge in practice, or in Aristotle’s terms, sophia (theoretical wisdom) and phronesis (practical wisdom). Theoretical wisdom is the prerequisite for practical wisdom—the knowledge of the ethically right means to achieve a morally good end, one that conduces to human flourishing.6See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, book 6. As philosopher Robert Nozick explains, “Wisdom is not just knowing fundamental truths, if these are unconnected with the guidance of life or with a perspective on its meaning…. What a wise person needs to know and understand” includes 

the most important goals and values of life—the ultimate goal, if there is one; what means will reach these goals without too great a cost; what kinds of dangers threaten the achieving of these goals; how to recognize and avoid or minimize these dangers; what different types of human beings are like in their actions and motives (as this presents dangers or opportunities); what is not possible or feasible to achieve (or avoid); how to tell what is appropriate when; … knowing what the true and unapparent value of various things is; when to take a long-term view; knowing the variety and obduracy of facts, institutions, and human nature.7Robert Nozick, The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2006), 269.

Although the wisdom of the wise can often be inscrutable to others, when the time and circumstances are right, that wisdom can become dazzlingly clear. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá once assured the Bahá’ís that the wisdom of a perplexing stipulation in the Sacred Scriptures would “erelong be made manifest as clearly as the sun at high noon.”8‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Selections from the Writings of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá (Bahá’í World Centre, 1978), 38.4, bahai.org/r/324741256. Using the same figure of speech, His grandson Shoghi Effendi, in answer to a question about a provision in ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s Will and Testament, indicated that “whatsoever has explicitly been revealed” would “eventually become clear and evident, even as the sun in its noon-tide glory.”9In Universal House of Justice, comp., Fire and Light: Selections from the Writings of Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, and from the Letters of Shoghi Effendi, bahai.org/r/151685661. But how does that happen?

We can trace the path by which wisdom that once seemed inscrutable, even defying belief, became as clear as the sun at high noon, in the parallel and sometimes intertwined history of two processes of sensemaking—one scientific and one religious—concerning the same phenomenon. Sensemaking refers to the method by which we ascribe meaning to experience in the world and, by doing so, construct social reality. Karl Weick, in defining his conception of sensemaking, describes “reality” as “an ongoing accomplishment that emerges from efforts to create order and make retrospective sense of what occurs.”10Karl Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations (Sage, 1995), 15.

The first of these two processes of sensemaking involves a sequence of events, discoveries, and controversies that would shatter established assumptions about both the physical world and the world order; the second involves efforts to understand the meaning of a passage in the Bahá’í Writings foreshadowing those same events and prescribing measures to avert the consequences. The first process began in 1896 with the scientific intuition of the French physicist Henri Becquerel, but years before he made his chance discovery, its world-historical significance and monumental consequences had already been described in the Writings of Bahá’u’lláh. 

In Words of Paradise, Bahá’u’lláh discussed a number of themes in addition to wisdom, including the true nature and virtues of the human being, the foundations of social order, and the means for ensuring the security and advancement of humanity, as well as the very “preservation of the world of being” itself. In a statement that epitomizes the central theme of His social teachings, He wrote:

O ye men of wisdom among nations! Shut your eyes to estrangement, then fix your gaze upon unity. Cleave tenaciously unto that which will lead to the well-being and tranquillity of all mankind. This span of earth is but one homeland and one habitation. It behoveth you to abandon vainglory which causeth alienation and to set your hearts on whatever will ensure harmony. In the estimation of the people of Bahá man’s glory lieth in his knowledge, his upright conduct, his praiseworthy character, his wisdom, and not in his nationality or rank.11Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets of Bahá’u’lláh, 6.24, bahai.org/r/869909903.

He then warned of the danger of abandoning the principle of moderation, stating that “if a thing is carried to excess it will become a source of evil”—as evidenced by the alarming tendencies displayed by Western civilization, which was already harnessing the power of modern technology to invent ever more deadly weaponry. “An infernal engine hath been devised,” He wrote, “and hath proved so cruel a weapon of destruction that its like none hath ever witnessed or heard.”12Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets of Bahá’u’lláh, 6.30, bahai.org/r/062742596. He may have been referring to the Maxim gun: invented in 1884, it was the first automatic machine gun, could fire over five hundred rounds per minute, and would become one of the deadliest weapons in modern history.13Malcolm W. Browne, “100 Years of Maxim’s Killing Machine,” New York Times, 26 November 1985, sec. C, 1. In the Bahá’í writings, the term “infernal engine” occurs in other instances in reference to weaponry. See, for example, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, in Star of the West 5, no. 8 (August 1914): 115–17, and Shoghi Effendi, quoted in a letter dated 7 July 1976 written on behalf of the Universal House of Justice to an individual, bahai.org/r/610082835. The “deeply-rooted and overwhelming corruptions” represented by such armaments, Bahá’u’lláh asserted, could not be expunged until the peoples of the world became reconciled and united in a common aim and a universal faith. Then He wrote: “Strange and astonishing things (asbáb-i-‘ajíbiy-i-gharíbih) exist in the earth but they are hidden from the minds and the understanding of men. These things are capable of changing the whole atmosphere of the earth and their contamination would prove lethal.”14Bahá’u’lláh, Tablets of Bahá’u’lláh, 6.31, bahai.org/r/803562132.

Today we have no trouble making sense of that statement; if we are perplexed, it is not by the statement itself—because we know it is true—but by the fact that He wrote it in 1889, decades before anyone else knew it was true. Those “things” in the earth that can lethally contaminate the atmosphere are now such an established part of humanity’s common knowledge that it is not even necessary to name them, because the answer is so obvious as to be clear as the sun at high noon. But that was not always the case.

SPIRITUALISM AND THE RADIUM CRAZE

In 1908 Bahá’u’lláh’s statement in Words of Paradise puzzled two American Bahá’í women, Helen Goodall and her daughter Ella Goodall Cooper, who had traveled to ‘Akká on a pilgrimage to meet ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. They had read this early, imprecise translation of the text: “A strange and wonderful instrument exists in the earth; but it is concealed from minds and souls. It is an instrument which has the power to change the atmosphere of the whole earth, and its infection causes destruction.”15The historical meaning of wonderful is “exciting wonder.” They asked: “Does this refer to an evil power such as psychic control? Is there some other power in the world beside God?”16Helen S. Goodall and Ella Goodall Cooper, Daily Lessons Received at Akka January 1908 (Bahá’í Publishing Society, 1908), 50. The notes of pilgrims, although of historical interest, have no authority and often represent only an approximation of the encounter and the words they record, as they are based on notes taken down from the words of the translator, whose English was often inadequate. From the context of their conversation, it is clear that they were referring to spirits of the dead exercising evil powers from beyond the grave. 

Today, the very idea that psychic forces wielded by evil spirits could possibly be what Bahá’u’lláh was referring to seems naive, even simpleminded—certainly unscientific. But in 1908, the Goodalls’ interpretation was not so improbable. It even resonated with the statements of some scientists of the day. The cultural milieu of the early twentieth century was permeated by a fascination with the supernatural and occult, one of the expressions of which was spiritualism, a movement that arose in the 1840s, reflecting the spiritual ferment of the era. Though originating in the United States, spiritualism spread to Europe and around the world, including to Iran, the Ottoman Empire, and Japan. It held that contact could be made with the spirits of the dead, who would answer by tapping, or by communicating through a “medium,” or through automatic writing, and might even show themselves to the living as ethereal apparitions. 

Spiritualists, far from being uneducated, anti-modern, or illiberal, tended to hold progressive views and to support causes including the abolition of slavery, women’s rights, labor reform, temperance, and socialism.17 Ann Braude, Radical Spirits: Spiritualism and Women’s Rights in Nineteenth-Century America (Indiana University Press, 2nd ed., 2001), 3. Even some prominent scientists were intrigued by the possibility of gaining access to psychic forces and communicating with spirits. Among the scientific and intellectual figures of the time who were interested in—if not seriously investigating or even convinced by—spiritualist phenomena were Alfred Russel Wallace, Henri Bergson, William James, William Crookes, and Marie and Pierre Curie. Thomas Edison attempted to build a device by which the dead could communicate with the living scientifically—without the “crude methods” of “tilting tables and raps and ouija boards and mediums.”18Austin C. Lescarboura, “Edison’s Views on Life and Death, Scientific American 30 October 1920, 446, jstor.org/stable/24991827. Spiritualism also intersected with another cultural phenomenon of the era that had a more direct connection to the topic of Bahá’u’lláh’s statement, and which was also the object of widespread misunderstanding that today seems incomprehensible: the radium craze.

Marie Curie’s discovery of radium in 1898 had set in motion an international obsession for the element. The perceptible effects of radium’s energy evoked a dimension beyond the physical—fitting neatly into the ambience of an era captivated by the idea of piercing the veil between the worlds. Other forms of radiation had been discovered, but until then only x-rays, with their ability to penetrate flesh and produce ghostly skeletal portraits, had excited much public interest. Radioactive elements such as uranium did not seem as interesting or important as radium, since they did not seem to “‘do’ anything of particular note.”19Lawrence Badash, “Radium, Radioactivity, and the Popularity of Scientific Discovery,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 122, no. 3 (9 June 1978): 145. It was radium—more than a million times more radioactive than uranium—that captured the public imagination. It glowed with an eerie luminescence; it gave off heat apparently without changing; it acted on bodies with an entirely new and thrilling power that seemed to promise life, healing, and even a cure for cancer. Soon people were drinking radioactive water—laced with radium—as a cure-all that was marketed as the “elixir of life.” Radium was added to products including chocolate, cosmetics, and toothpaste (promising a “radiant smile”), and painted on items like watch dials and the buckles of bedroom slippers to make them glow in the dark.20Michel Rose and Marion Douet, “France’s 20th Century Radium Craze Still Haunts Paris,” Reuters, 19 July 2012, reuters.com/article/us-france-radium-decontamination-idUSBRE86I0AH20120719; Taylor Orci, “How We Realized Putting Radium in Everything Was Not the Answer,” The Atlantic, 7 March 2013, theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/03/how-we-realized-putting-radium-in-everything-was-not-the-answer/273780/.

Advertisement for cosmetic products containing radium, from the 1930s (photo by Jon Evans)

It is not hard to understand how people might draw a connection between spiritualist phenomena and this new, seemingly spectral element that displayed tangible evidence of invisible power. In Japan, according to Maika Nakao, “The concept of radium was frequently combined with spirituality, and many spiritualists were inspired by radiation and radium,” viewing it as a visible manifestation of spirit. One prominent Japanese spiritualist, she writes, “tried to prove the existence of spirit by explaining the nature of radiation.”21Maika Nakao, “Radium Traffic: Radiation, Science and Spiritualism in Early Twentieth-Century Japan,” Medical History 65, no. 1 (2021): 39, doi:10.1017/mdh.2020.47.

Making connections between radioactivity and a supernatural dimension found inspiration, if not support, in the writings of certain scientists, who had made similar speculations about x-rays.22See Simone Natale, “A Cosmology of Invisible Fluids: Wireless, X-Rays, and Psychical Research around 1900,” Canadian Journal of Communication, 36, no. 2, doi.org/10.22230/cjc.2011v36n2a2368. In 1897 the eminent chemist William Crookes, whose cathode ray tubes enabled the discovery of electrons, suggested that x-rays, which were initially thought to travel in the ether along with light and other electromagnetic waves, might be “a possible mode of transmitting intelligence.”23William Crookes, Presidential Addresses to the Society for Psychical Research, 1882–1911 (Glasgow: Society for Psychical Research, 1912), 100. Radium was something more: it was a numinous substance. The radiochemist Frederick Soddy, winner of the 1921 Nobel Prize in Chemistry, in a widely read book of lectures given in 1908—the same year the Goodalls visited ‘Akká—described radium in distinctly anthropomorphic terms and in tones of almost religious awe:

There is something sublime about its aloofness from and its indifference to its external environment. It seems to claim lineage with the worlds beyond us, fed with the same inexhaustible fires, urged by the same uncontrollable mechanism which keeps the great suns alight in the heavens over endless periods of time. This tiny speck of matter we can hold in our hands exhibits in perfect miniature many ancient mysteries, forgotten almost in their familiarity, or mistakenly and too easily dismissed as belonging and appropriate to the infinitely great dimensions of the universe.24Frederick Soddy, The Interpretation of Radium, Being the Substance of Six Free Popular Experimental Lectures Delivered at the University of Glasgow, 1908, 2nd ed. (John Murray, 1909), 37–38.

With such ideas circulating in the voice of science, the notion that powerful forces hidden in the earth could be linked to forces from “worlds beyond us” was already planted in the public imagination. It was not so illogical after all, that the first thought that occurred to the Goodalls as the most likely, or relevant, phenomenon to which Bahá’u’lláh’s text could have referred was psychic forces. That the Goodalls’ questions were framed in terms of spiritualist concepts (whether or not they gave credence to them) is evident in that they also asked ‘Abdu’l-Bahá whether spirits could influence people and take possession of their will, and what “power” was involved in automatic writing. They recorded that ‘Abdu’l-Bahá replied, to the first question, that spirits could do no such thing and, to the second, that automatic writing came from within the writer.25Goodall and Cooper, Daily Lessons, 43. But if the Goodalls expected ‘Abdu’l-Bahá to explain the passage about the strange and wonder-inspiring things in the earth in a way that confirmed their own assumptions, they would have been not only disappointed but baffled as well. They recorded in their notes that He began to talk instead about the fundamental forces of nature, saying (in the words of the Persian translator): 

This is a deep and lengthy subject, but, briefly, there is, as we know, a power that composes and a power that decomposes. The world of existence is constantly revolving through the changes of building up and tearing down. When elements are attracted something is composed, and when these same elements are repelled that form is decomposed. As by the will of God the power of composition exists, so also by will of God the power of decomposition exists.26Goodall and Cooper, Daily Lessons, 51.

He went on to explain that these two forces are expressed metaphorically in religious scriptures by the Angel of Life, symbolizing the power of composition or attraction, and the Angel of Death, signifying that of decomposition or repulsion. But what, the pilgrims may have wondered, could possibly connect an instrumentality powerful enough to change the atmosphere of the earth with the forces of composition and decomposition? ‘Abdu’l-Bahá summarily dismissed the interpretation that it involved psychic forces exercised by the spirits of the dead. According to the Goodalls’ account, He explained that the souls of evil people who have died exercise no power over the living, that good is stronger than evil, and that even when those people were alive, they had very little power—how much less would they have after they were dead. And in any case, they were nowhere near this planet.27Goodall and Cooper, Daily Lessons, 51. We do not know how He explained, on that occasion, the connection between the strange and astonishing things in the earth and the physical forces of composition and decomposition, because the notes stop there.

That the forces of composition and decomposition applied to elements at the level of chemical compounds was an established scientific fact at the time. Although electrons had been discovered in 1897 (in a Crookes tube), it took some years before it was fully recognized that the atom was not the indivisible unit of matter it was long believed to be but was itself composed of even smaller particles. Frederick Soddy’s own lectures on the history of chemistry in 1900 had relied on Dalton’s theory of atoms as indivisible.28Richard E. Sclove, “From Alchemy to Atomic War: Frederick Soddy’s ‘Technology Assessment’ of Atomic Energy, 1900–1915,” Science, Technology, & Human Values 14, no. 2 (1989): 166–7. But by 1902 Soddy and Ernest Rutherford had discovered that atoms themselves were also subject to decomposition, or disintegration—a phenomenon that Marie Curie had named “radioactivity”—in which they became transformed (or, as Soddy preferred to call it, deliberately borrowing the term from alchemy, “transmuted”) into new and different elements in a violent process that released enormous amounts of energy.29In 1900 Marie and Pierre Curie described—in terms that seem to echo Bahá’u’lláh’s observation—radioactivity as “an enigma, a deeply astonishing subject” (quoted in Barbara Goldsmith, Obsessive Genius: The Inner World of Marie Curie [WW Norton, 2005], chap. 9). That would have been no surprise to ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Who possessed a profound and prescient knowledge of the realities of things and was well versed not only in the theories of the philosophers and with Bahá’u’lláh’s statements such as “within every atom traces of the sun have been made manifest,” but also with the words of the eighteenth-century Persian mystical poet Hátif-i-Iṣfahání: “Split the atom’s heart, and lo! / Within it thou wilt find a sun.”30Bahá’u’lláh, The Kitáb-i-Íqán, par. 28, bahai.org/r/990539395; Bahá’u’lláh, The Call of the Divine Beloved (Bahá’í World Centre, 2019), 2.23, bahai.org/r/474041477. See also ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s treatise “Tablet of the Universe” (Lawḥ-i-Aflákíyyih). He also understood the inherently incomplete and contingent character of human efforts to make sense of the world: 

Mathematicians, astronomers, chemical scientists continually disprove and reject the conclusions of the ancients; nothing is fixed, nothing final; everything is continually changing because human reason is progressing along new roads of investigation and arriving at new conclusions every day. In the future much that is announced and accepted as true now will be rejected and disproved. And so it will continue ad infinitum.31‘Abdu’l-Bahá, The Promulgation of Universal Peace (Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1982), no. 9, “16 April 1912, Talk at Hotel Ansonia to Bahá’í Friends of New Jersey, Broadway and Seventy-Third Street, New York,” bahai.org/r/303993171.

In His Writings and talks, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá often discussed composition and decomposition (or attraction and repulsion) as natural forces that operate at all levels of existence; He also employed these concepts in His philosophical arguments for the immaterial nature of the soul as a simple, uncompounded substance. In such arguments He used an analogy of the atom “as a constituent of organic composition,” in which context the atoms themselves do not decompose.32‘Abdu’l-Bahá, no. 96, “27 August 1912: Talk at Metaphysical Club, Boston, Massachusetts,” bahai.org/r/792446407. As ‘Abdu’l-Bahá Himself explains, in these discourses He is speaking in relative terms that depend on the context.33See ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, 80.4–6. However, in His account of the nature of material phenomena, it is implicit that, at the most fundamental level, the atom is not the indivisible constituent of matter. If the axiom that all “forms of existence in the material universe … are the result of composition” is true, it also applies to the atom, or the atom would not be a material phenomenon.34‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Promulgation, no. 23, “24 April 1912: Talk at Home of Mrs. Andrew J. Dyer, 1937 Thirteenth Street, NW, Washington, D.C.,” bahai.org/r/376710334.

AN IMPETUS FOR PEACE

In 1910 ‘Abdu’l-Bahá set out on a series of journeys, traveling first to Egypt and then to the West, where He gave hundreds of lectures and interviews, introducing the Bahá’í teachings to audiences in cities from Budapest to San Francisco and advocating for the abolition of war and universal peace. During these travels, on several occasions He alluded to or explicitly mentioned Bahá’u’lláh’s enigmatic statement and warned about the mysterious force in the earth that could have catastrophic effects. While en route to New York on the R.M.S. Cedric, a discussion over tea turned to the topic of dirigibles and airplanes. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá is recorded as telling those present that airplanes would be used for military purposes and that “There will come to exist such instruments [of war] as to cause all the means of destruction in the past to be looked upon as children’s playthings.”35Maḥmúd Zarqání, Maḥmúd’s Diary: The Diary of Mírzá Maḥmúd-i-Zarqání Chronicling ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s Journey to America, trans. Mohi Sobhani (George Ronald, 1998), 27. In San Francisco, while conversing with a group of Bahá’ís including the Goodalls, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá suddenly began to speak about the statement in Words of Paradise, saying that an element in the earth would be discovered that was so destructive that it could obliterate entire cities and would become an impetus for peace, as the nations would fear the destruction of humanity.36National Spiritual Assembly of the United States to Shoghi Effendi, cable dated 24 February 1946, Bahá’í World Centre Archives, Haifa, Israel.

On another occasion, in Paris, He brought up the issue when He made a point of calling on a visiting diplomat whose wife had expressed a wish to meet Him. That diplomat was Viscount Minoji Arakawa (1857–1949), the Japanese Minister to Spain. As later recounted by Lady Blomfield, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá spoke to him on topics including the importance of Japan, the abolition of war, and scientific discoveries, adding: “There is in existence a stupendous force, as yet, happily, undiscovered by man.” ‘Abdu’l-Bahá said He hoped this force would not be discovered by science until civilization became spiritualized because “in the hands of men of lower material nature, this power would be able to destroy the whole earth.”37Lady Blomfeld, “Some Memories of the Sojourn of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá in Paris, October-December, 1911,” The Bahá’í World 6: 656–7, bahaiworld.bahai.org/library/memories-of-the-sojourn-of-abdul-baha-in-paris. In 1919 He was reported as describing it as being a power like that of dynamite.38“Talks of Abdul Baha: Notes Taken by H. S. Fugeta,” [1919], 33–34.

Although today we readily understand and appreciate the wisdom of those warnings, the existence of such a force within the earth—of elements whose decomposition (which releases radioactivity) could change the whole atmosphere of the planet and cause lethal contamination—was not definitively proved until July 1945 when, in the New Mexico desert, the scientists of the Manhattan Project detonated a plutonium implosion device, demonstrating the power of the energy concealed within the heart of the atom and making Bahá’u’lláh’s statement a self-evident truth as clear as the sun at noon. In this case, uniquely, the figure of speech was literally true because there is nothing else on earth that is so much like the noonday sun; an American army general who observed the Trinity test that day wrote that the blast light had an “intensity many times that of the midday sun.”39Thomas Farrell, quoted in Alex Wellerstein, “The First Light of Trinity,” The New Yorker, 16 July 2015, newyorker.com/ tech/annals-of-technology/the-first-light-of-the-trinity-atomic-test. But until that moment, not even the scientists themselves really knew—to a certainty—what was going to happen. Before the test J. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the laboratory at Los Alamos, bet another scientist ten dollars that the “gadget” would not work. Physicist Enrico Fermi suggested, perhaps only half-jokingly, that they should place bets on whether the blast would ignite the whole atmosphere of the earth or just destroy New Mexico.40Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (Simon and Schuster, 1986), 662, 665.

Pierre and Marie Curie at work in a laboratory.

In retrospect it may seem that the vast destructive power latent within the atom should have been obvious from the start. Unmistakable signs of the power of radioactivity were evident soon after the discovery of radium, but the extent of that power and its lethal effects were not yet understood. Pierre Curie deliberately exposed his arm to the element and studied the burns; Marie Curie kept some radium beside her bed as a night-light.41Nanny Fröman, “Marie and Pierre Curie and the Discovery of Polonium and Radium,” NobelPrize.org, nobelprize.org/prizes/themes/marie-and-pierre-curie-and-the-discovery-of-polonium-and-radium/. They both suffered what were only later recognized as symptoms of radiation illness, and she would die of aplastic anemia due to long-term exposure. Although we might think, from our perspective, that enough knowledge must have been available to enable people to reason out the probable consequences of radioactivity’s evident power and its dangerous nature, it is all too easy to fall into the fallacy of hindsight bias by assuming that people in the past had the knowledge that we have now.

In fact, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the prevailing scientific view of radioactivity was quite different. Radioactivity, and radium in particular, was initially perceived not as a force of decomposition and an agent of destruction and death, but as one of composition, with life-giving properties, and even as a “biological” force. According to Luis Campos, “Not only were radioactive phenomena characterized in quasi-biological ways from the earliest days, by their discoverers and by others, but radium itself … was often described as a ‘half-living’ element in scientific and popular texts alike.” As he notes, “many botanists and geneticists were eagerly remarking that radium held the key to the secret of life.”42Luis A. Campos, Radium and the Secret of Life (University of Chicago Press, 2015), 2. The signs of tissue alteration that would later be recognized as the destructive, and ultimately lethal, effects of radiation were first interpreted as its opposite and as a form of “evolution,” a term Soddy frequently used in his descriptions of radioactive decay.43Campos, Radium, 2, 5; Frederick Soddy, “Evolution of Matter,” Science and Life: Aberdeen Addresses (Dutton, 1920). The true nature, effects, and implications of the energy hidden within the atom eluded general understanding and acceptance because the very idea that the earth itself could contain a hitherto unknown source of power that could obliterate all life was radically new and unthinkable. 

THE UNTHINKABLE RADICALLY NEW

Radioactivity and atomic energy were literally unthinkable because they were radically new. Since we make sense of experience and organize our knowledge by reference to our mental representation of the world, assigning meaning to new information in terms of old information (that is, information we have acquired from experience and which has been incorporated into that conceptual model), a phenomenon that is radically new is not intelligible: it does not fit into any of the categories based on prior experience that we use to interpret and make sense of information presented to the mind. Thus, paradoxically, the effort to understand an experience that is unlike anything ever encountered before is thwarted by the very process we rely on to make sense of the world. As physicist Norris Bradbury, who worked on the Manhattan Project, observed: “Most experiences in life can be comprehended by prior experiences, but the atom bomb did not fit into any preconceptions possessed by anybody.”44Quoted in Rhodes, Making of the Atomic Bomb, 674.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, there was no category in the structure of accepted scientific knowledge for an entity that possessed power of the kind or the magnitude that was hidden within the atom, just as there had been no category to make sense of the phenomenon of radioactivity itself, which, Soddy had written, “ran counter to every principle of physical science.”45Soddy, “Evolution of Matter,” 91. In a 1904 lecture he had stated that, with the discovery of radioactivity, “a new world has been opened to us … in which the atom is not the unit, in which the forces are not chemical, and in which common physical conceptions such as temperature are without meaning.”46Frederick Soddy, “The Evolution of Matter as Revealed by the Radioactive Elements,” Memoirs and Proceedings of the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society, 48 part 2 (1904): 14. In his 1908 lectures, speaking of the nature of “atomic disintegration,” which was “sudden and explosive in character,” Soddy again alluded to its radical unthinkability as he explained that

in the complete change of one grain of radium no less than 125,000,000 calories would be evolved. The energy evolved in the change of radium is nearly a million times greater than that evolved from a similar weight of matter undergoing any change known previously to the discovery of radioactivity. By the burning of a grain of coal, for example, only about 500 calories are obtained. No wonder then that to account for the boundless energy displayed everywhere in the starry heavens proved a difficult problem for physicists, acquainted with no more energetic chemical process than the burning of coal!47Soddy, Interpretation of Radium, 151, 164.

But even after three more decades of research, expert opinion remained unconvinced as to whether atomic energy could ever be accessed: more than one prominent physicist doubted that splitting atoms could ever produce more than negligible energy, while some scornfully dismissed the very idea as not only scientifically unproven but ignorant nonsense, and rejected the possibility of weaponizing that energy as remote—or at least “absurdly premature.”48Rhodes, Making of the Atomic Bomb, 228, 281.

Soddy was one of the first scientists to understand the terrifying practical implications of the “gigantic forces” latent within the earth and in 1903 had written that “the knowledge of their existence must … make us regard the planet on which we live rather as a storehouse stuffed with explosives, inconceivably more powerful than any we know, and possibly only awaiting a suitable detonator to cause the earth to revert to chaos.”49Frederick Soddy, “Some Recent Advances in Radioactivity,” Contemporary Review 83 (1903): 720. The carnage of the First World War would present him with evidence of the devastation and death that modern technology could deliver when harnessed for military use: in 1916, on the opening day of the First Battle of the Somme, more than 19,000 British soldiers were killed—a large proportion of them by the German version of the Maxim gun.50Browne, “100 Years”; Imperial War Museums, “First Day of the Battle of the Somme,” iwm.org.uk/history/first-world-war/somme/first-day. In a lecture in 1915 Soddy raised the alarm about the potential danger of weaponizing atomic energy:

Imagine, if you can, what the present war would be like if such an explosive had actually been discovered instead of being still in the keeping of the future. Yet it is a discovery that conceivably might be made to-morrow, in time for its development and perfection for the use or destruction, let us say, of the next generation, and which, it is pretty certain, will be made by science sooner or later.51Frederick Soddy, “Physical Force: Man’s Servant or His Master?” Science and Life, 36.

Frederick Soddy

That same year, in a speech, he said: “The social effect of recent advances in physical science promises to be annihilating, unless, before it is too late, there arises an equal and compensating advance, of which there is at present no sign, in the moral and spiritual forces of society.”52Quoted in Sclove, “From Alchemy,” 179. And in 1917 he warned that if the vast energy within the atom could be tapped, war “would not be the lingering agony it is today. Any selected section of the world, or the whole of it if necessary, could be depopulated with a swiftness and dispatch that would leave nothing to be desired.”53Soddy, “Evolution of Matter,” 107.

But to many at that time, his words were hyperbolic, unscientific ravings that belonged rather to science fiction than to science. In 1928 Robert Millikan, the 1923 Nobel Laureate in Physics, told the Chemists’ Club in New York: “There is no likelihood man can ever tap the power of the atom. The glib supposition of utilizing atomic energy when our coal supply has run out is a completely unscientific Utopian dream, a childish bug-a-boo.”54Quoted in C. R. Richmond, “Population Exposure from the Fuel Cycle: Review and Future Direction.” (Oakridge National Laboratory, 1987), University of North Texas Digital Library, Office of Scientific and Technical Information Technical Reports, digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1086292/. The next year, addressing the Society of Arts and Sciences, he sarcastically disparaged Soddy’s warnings, saying that “if you belong to the group … which fears the too rapid advance of science and lives in dread of the day when some unscrupulous, or careless, Dr. Faust may touch off the stupendous subatomic powder magazine and blow this comfortable world of ours into star dust, you may henceforth banish your hobgoblin and sleep in peace.…” because, as Millikan assured the audience, “there is no appreciable energy available to man through atomic disintegration.”55Robert A. Millikan, “Michelson’s Economic Value,” Science, New Series, 69, no.1793 (10 May 1929): 484–5, jstor.org/stable/1652629; emphasis in original. In 1930 he went even further out on that limb, summoning Science herself to testify against Soddy:

She has kept steadily at work since Mr. Soddy raised the hobgoblin of dangerous quantities of available subatomic energy, and has brought to light good evidence that this particular hobgoblin—like most of the bugaboos that crowd in on the mind of ignorance—was a myth.… Now the new evidence born of further scientific study is to the effect that it is highly improbable that there is any appreciable amount of available subatomic energy to tap.56Robert A. Millikan, “Alleged Sins of Science,” Scribner’s Magazine, February 1930, 121, gwern.net/doc/existential-risk/1930-millikan.pdf.

He went on to insist—somewhat incongruously for a scientist making an argument about physics—that those fearful of the consequences of atomic disintegration could “sleep in peace with the consciousness that the creator has put some fool-proof elements into his handiwork and that man is powerless to do it any titanic physical damage.”57Millikan, “Alleged Sins,” 121.

Millikan was not alone in his pessimism. According to Richard Rhodes, “by the mid-1930s the three most original living physicists had each spoken to the question of harnessing nuclear energy,” expressing doubt about the possibility—namely, Soddy’s colleague Ernest Rutherford, Albert Einstein, and Nils Bohr.58Rhodes, Making of the Atomic Bomb, 228. In 1932 Einstein said, “There is not the slightest indication that nuclear energy will ever be obtainable. It would mean that the atom would have to be shattered at will.”59Quoted in “Atom Energy Hope Is Spiked by Einstein,” Pittsburgh Post Gazette, 28 December 1934. In 1946, after it had been proven that it could indeed be done, Einstein wrote: “The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe…. a new type of thinking is essential if mankind is to survive and move toward higher levels.”60Quoted in “Atomic Education Urged by Einstein,” New York Times, 25 May 1946, 11.

In 1937 Shoghi Effendi, who had been appointed by ‘Abdu’l-Bahá as Guardian and head of the Bahá’í Faith, was asked about Bahá’u’lláh’s statement concerning the hidden force in the earth that could lethally contaminate the atmosphere. As it turns out, Shoghi Effendi’s response, written on his behalf by his secretary, was more scientifically accurate than the scientists’ dismissal. It said: “The instrument referred to by Bahá’u’lláh has not yet been fully discovered.”61Letter dated 9 August 1937 written on behalf of Shoghi Effendi to an individual, Bahá’í World Centre Archives, Haifa, Israel. That was true: artificial nuclear fission would not be fully discovered until the following year, 1938, and it would be another seven years until its power would be decisively demonstrated on the test site at Los Alamos. In October 1945, after atomic weapons had been used to devastate two Japanese cities, Shoghi Effendi could draw the conclusion, in response to a question, that “There is no direct reference to atomic bombs in the teachings, but many references to the powers latent within the universe; atomic force is obviously one of these powers.”62Letter dated 26 October 1945 written on behalf of Shoghi Effendi to an individual, Bahá’í World Centre Archives, Haifa, Israel. It was only then that one could use that word—”obviously”—because finally the fact that there were things in the earth that could change the atmosphere, and whose contamination would prove lethal, had become just that—obvious—like the sun at high noon. The next year, he confirmed in a letter to an inquirer: “The words of Bahá’u’lláh regarding ‘a strange and wonderful instrument …’ can, in the light of what the Master [‘Abdu’l-Bahá] said in San Francisco, be taken as a reference to the great destructive power atomic energy can be made to release.”63Letter dated 16 March 1946 written on behalf of Shoghi Effendi to an individual, in Helen Hornby, comp., Lights of Guidance: A Bahá’í Reference File, rev. ed. (New Delhi: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1988), 479.

The phenomenon of radioactivity—and the sheer immensity of the power within the atom—were discoveries that scientists were unprepared for, and many reacted first with the reflexive denial that greets the shock of the new and unprecedented, which does not conform to anything they know or believe to be true. Even for Millikan, the discoverer of cosmic rays, the true extent of the power hidden in the atom was outside all experience and therefore beyond belief.

MAKING SENSE

As we make sense of experience, fitting the new information into our conceptual representation of the world, the new phenomenon is initially assigned meaning in terms of the categories available in that model. This heuristic process enables understanding, but it also subtly constrains it as the categories operate as what Kenneth Burke called “terministic screens”—filtering thought so as to “direct the attention into some channels rather than others”—and excluding some directions altogether.64Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action (University of California Press, 1966), 46. Moreover, as Burke wrote,

Not only does the nature of our terms affect the nature of our observations, in the sense that the terms direct the attention to one field rather than to another. Also, many of the “observations” are but implications of the particular terminology in terms of which the observations are made. In brief, much that we take as observations about “reality” may be but the spinning out of possibilities implicit in our particular choice of terms.65Burke, Language, 46; emphasis in original.

If no adequate category exists, we may try to force the new information into what we perceive to be the closest or most relevant category available—even if it is only “bugaboo”—and even if doing so results in distortion, misinterpretation, and failure of understanding. Or we may ignore the parts that don’t fit, dismissing them as irrelevant or as meaningless noise. These futile efforts are signs that we have reached the limit of human rationality, “where,” as Nassim Nicholas Taleb puts it, “our representation of reality ceases to apply but we do not know it.”66Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (Random House, 2010), 2nd ed., ebook, chap. 1. Similar to Burke, Taleb notes that categorizing, while unavoidable, is inherently unreliable because categories, as abstractions (and thus stereotypes), are inevitably reductive, suppressing critical distinctions. Categorizing, Taleb writes, “becomes pathological when the category is seen as definitive, preventing people from considering the fuzziness of boundaries, let alone revising their categories.”67Taleb, Black Swan, chap. 1.

Pietro Longhi, The Alchemists, 1757

Soddy, Rutherford, and others, in their initial attempts to make sense of the strange new phenomenon of radioactivity—and not entirely unlike like the Goodalls in their efforts to make sense of the scriptural text—seized on what seemed to be the most relevant of the concepts and images available in the repertoire of categories that populated their representation of reality. For the Goodalls, those happened to come from spiritualism; for some scientists, including Soddy, they were drawn from alchemy, which experienced a resurgence of interest around the same time as the rise of spiritualism, as part of the prevalent fascination with the occult. Mark Morrisson, in his study of the peculiar connection between the nascent science of atomic physics and the concurrent interest in alchemy, claims that “the broad alchemical revival had an impact on the way some scientists understood and portrayed their research programs” and “obliquely helped inform … the emerging science of radioactivity and radioactive transformation.”68Mark Morrisson, Modern Alchemy: Occultism and the Emergence of Atomic Theory (Oxford University Press, 2007), 5.

Before Soddy himself came to understand the destructive power latent in the atom, he was one of those who initially conceptualized radium as having a living quality, associating it with the alchemical “philosopher’s stone,” which, he wrote, “was accredited the power not only of transmuting the metals, but of acting as the elixir of life.” He found this analogy to be

a perfect and but very slightly allegorical expression of the actual present views we hold to-day. It does not require much effort of the imagination to see in energy the life of the physical universe, and the key to the primary fountains of the physical life of the universe to-day is known to be transmutation. Is then this old association of the power of transmutation with the elixir of life merely a coincidence?69Soddy, Interpretation of Radium, 243.

The harsh reality of experience would eventually force scientists to abandon the fanciful but tragically mistaken conception of radioactivity as a benevolent, living force and replace it with a more realistic understanding of radioactivity as a process of decay and a bringer of death. But fully grasping the magnitude of the atom’s destructive power would require a strange imaginative confluence of ideas in which science and fiction influenced each other.

Cover of The World Set Free by H. G. Wells, First Edition, 1914

A key step in the collective process of making sense of this new phenomenon involved the writer H. G. Wells. He had read Soddy’s popular book of lectures on radium and, struck by its description of the power inherent in radioactivity, wrote a novel called The World Set Free, which he dedicated to Soddy’s book and published in 1914. The novel—in which a scientist representing Soddy speaks words taken from Soddy’s book—describes a war in which the European states use weapons against each other that Wells called—coining the term— “atomic bombs.” Wells imagined atomic weapons as black spheres with handles, which were dropped by hand out the window of an airplane to destroy entire cities by continuous explosion (the real nature of a nuclear blast was still unimaginable).70H. G. Wells, The World Set Free (Macmillan, 1914), chap. 2, sec. 3, gutenberg.org /files/1059/1059-h/1059-h.htm.

In the novel, the cataclysmic results of this war lead the nations of the world to come together to form a world state that would ensure global peace.71Sclove, “From Alchemy,” 179. Wells had heard of the Bahá’í Faith and of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá but was already a globalist by the time ‘Abdu’l-Bahá made his journey to the West, during which He lectured widely in Britain about the Bahá’í teachings including the unity of nations and universal peace. Wells comments on the phenomenon of being unable to see what later would be obvious: “Certainly it seems now that nothing could have been more obvious to the people of the earlier twentieth century than the rapidity with which war was becoming impossible. And as certainly they did not see it. They did not see it until the atomic bombs burst in their fumbling hands.”72Wells, World Set Free, chap. 2, sec. 5.

Frederick Soddy, in turn, read Wells’s novel just as World War I was beginning to display, on the battlefields of Europe, the gruesome evidence of the destructive nature of modern weapons. Against that background, reading the novel galvanized Soddy to realize that atomic energy could be used to develop even more powerful weapons than those that were already causing deaths in the tens and hundreds of thousands in mere days, and impelled him in 1915 to issue his first public warnings about the danger.73Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Harvard University Press, 1988), 29.

But by 1933 even Soddy’s former colleague Rutherford appeared to have given up on the idea of accessing atomic energy in any practical way. He was reported as telling a meeting of British scientists:

We may in these processes obtain very great quantities of energy, but on the average we cannot hope to obtain energy for practical use in this way. The bombardment of the atom is a very poor and inefficient way of producing energy and anyone who is looking for a source of cheap power in the transformation of the atom, is talking pure moonshine.74A. C. Cummings, “Power Flow from Atoms Impossible,” The Calgary Daily Herald, 7 October 1933, 28. Jenkin argues, however, that Rutherford did realize, but was intentionally downplaying, the potentiality as well as the danger (John G. Jenkin, “Atomic Energy Is ‘Moonshine’: What Did Rutherford Really Mean?” Physics in Perspective 13, no. 2 [June 2011]: 128–45).

The account of Rutherford’s speech that appeared in The Times was read by the Hungarian physicist Leo Szilárd, who was then living in England. Szilárd had also read Wells’s novel, and he wondered if Rutherford just might be wrong. Ruminating on the possibility while crossing a street in London, Szilárd suddenly realized how a nuclear chain reaction could be achieved and later proved it. In 1939 he explained to Albert Einstein how atomic energy could be weaponized (Einstein said that the idea hadn’t occurred to him), and the letter they sent to President Roosevelt warning about German research toward that goal led to the creation of the Manhattan Project, and, six years later, to the detonation of the device whose light was so intense that, like the sun’s, it reflected off the moon.75William Lanouette with Bela Silard, Genius in the Shadows: A Biography of Leo Szilard, the Man behind the Bomb (University of Chicago Press, 1992), 207; Rhodes, Making of the Atomic Bomb, 672.

HOBGOBLINS AND MOONSHINE

From this account of the emergence into human consciousness of the reality of the power hidden within the atom and its implications for the future of humanity and the planet itself, we have seen that what is radically new and unprecedented cannot be properly understood by forcing it into the received categories of conceptual structures based on prior experience. If the radically new is to become intelligible, enter the body of shared knowledge, and become part of social reality, a process must take place as events unfold over time and new experiences are subjected to conscious analysis in a reflective collective enterprise of critical sensemaking. First, we instinctively try to fit the new information into the available categories in our mental representation of the world. If the new information does not fit into those categories, it will appear anomalous. If we persist in interpreting it in terms of inadequate categories, then anomalies, incoherence, and dissonance will proliferate. If we are committed to the preservation, at all costs, of the conceptual structure and its categories—whether it is that of science, of religious tradition, or of ideology—we may (like the Muslim divines who constructed implausible reinterpretations of Quranic verses to make them conform to the Ptolemaic geocentric theory that the verses actually contradicted), try to force the data to fit the theory.76See ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, 7.14, and Tablet of the Universe, par. 22. Or we may (like William Crookes, who might have been the discoverer of x-rays had he not dismissed as a manufacturing defect the fogging that appeared on the photographic plates stored near his cathode ray tubes), misinterpret the significant unknown as an insignificant known. Misjudging the radically new by miscategorizing it can lead to catastrophe, whether by blindly embracing the toxic as tonic, as in the radium craze, or by dismissing it as hobgoblins and moonshine.

The unfolding of events over time—along with the reflective, ongoing conversation to make sense of those events—makes the knowledge publicly available and only then provides a perspective that permits reflection on the developments that led to the emergence of that knowledge and its progressive elaboration, revision, and refinement. In retrospect, it can be all too easy to think, as Thomas Huxley did on being told of Darwin’s theory of natural selection, “How extremely stupid not to have thought of that.”77Quoted in Julian Huxley, On Living in a Revolution (Harper & Brothers, 1944), 108. But at the beginning of the process, the end is not at all obvious, much less as clear as the sun at high noon—not even to (or especially not to) experts, who tend to have a vested interest in the conceptual systems, discourses, and paradigms that undergird their own claims to expertise. Even those who perceive—whether through scientific intuition, creative imagination, or divine inspiration and wisdom—a truth of the reality of things that is not yet generally known, will not be able to produce irrefutable evidence to convince all doubters, because no matter how accurate the warning or how valid the conclusion, the evidence only emerges as the consequence of a sequence of events in time and the discourse that strives to make sense of them, which has not yet taken place. 

As Taleb notes, the key to avoiding the trap of “naive empiricism”—that is, reliance on inductive reasoning based on experience, which is vulnerable to confirmation bias and the fallacy of hasty conclusion—is knowledge.78Taleb, Black Swan, chap. 4. And the knowledge that is most conducive to avoiding traps of all kinds is wisdom. Thus, until events unfold, acting on faith in the counsel of the wise—whose knowledge of the realities of things enables them to see farther; to perceive relationships, implications, and consequences that others cannot; and to know the right response to every exigency, like the physician who knows the right remedy to treat the cause of an illness—would seem to be the most rational course, especially when dismissing that counsel carries a high risk of mass destruction and death or, in less dire cases, merely prolongs the suffering that the remedy was meant to cure.

In the late nineteenth century, there were others, such as Jean de Bloch (who published his six-volume work The Future of War a decade after Bahá’u’lláh had warned, in Words of Paradise, about modern weaponry), who had also concluded that future wars would be far more devastating than previous wars. Bloch was disregarded by many experts, and it was widely assumed that international developments, including the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration as a result of the first Peace Conference at The Hague in 1899, and even the fearsome power of modern weapons, had made war “unthinkable.” A professor of history assured Frederick Soddy in 1900 “that there would never be another war.”79Sclove, “From Alchemy,” 178. So, people did not believe ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s warnings that the approaching storm would be an unprecedented cataclysm for the world. In 1914, after the war had begun, He commented on why His warnings had been dismissed:

While travelling in Europe and America I met altruistic and sanctified souls who were my confidants and associates concerning the question of Universal Peace and who agreed with me and joined their voices with mine regarding the principle of the Oneness of the World of Humanity; but alas, they were very few! The leaders of public opinion and the great statesmen believed that the massing of huge armies and the annual increase of military forces insured peace and friendship among nations. At that time I explained that this theory was based on a false conception; for it is an inevitable certainty that these serried ranks and disciplined armies will be rushed one day into the heat of the battlefields and these inflammable materials will unquestionably be exploded and the explosion will be through one tiny spark; then a world conflagration will be witnessed, the lurid flames of which shall redden all the horizons. Because the sphere of their thoughts was contracted and their intellectual eyes blind, they could not acknowledge the above explanation….

          … Although the ends of war were evident and manifest to the sages and scholars, they are now made clear and plain to all the people. No sane person can at this time deny the fact that war is the most dreadful calamity in the world of humanity… and that war is the most ruinous catastrophe and the most deplorable adversity.”80‘Abdu’l-Bahá, “No Sane Person Can at This Time Deny the Fact that War Is the Most Dreadful Calamity in the World of Humanity,” Star of the West 5, no. 16 (31 December 1914): 244.

Many of the themes in ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s talks and Writings explaining the dynamics of international conflict, including the massing of military force, the accumulation of armaments, and the lack of trust among nations, closely parallel what would, in the years following the Second World War, be conceptualized in International Relations theory as the “security dilemma,” while His prescription for arms reduction, a binding system of collective security, and an international tribunal anticipate the measures that would eventually be proposed to mitigate those dynamics.

Although it was naively hoped that the Great War would be (in the words of H. G. Wells) a “war to end war,” after the guns had fallen silent the root cause of conflict still festered.81See Amín Egea, “Reading Reality in Times of Crisis: ‘Abdu’l-Bahá and the Great War,” The Bahá’í World XXXV 2006–2021 (Bahá’í World Centre, 2024), bahaiworld.bahai.org/library/reading-reality-in-times-of-crisis/; and Hoda Mahmoudi and Janet A. Khan, A World Without War: ‘Abdu’l-Bahá and the Discourse for Global Peace (Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing, 2020). In 1919 ‘Abdu’l-Bahá was reported to have told visiting pilgrims that the peace was only a “false dawn.”82“Talks of Abdul Baha,” 33–34. Until the oneness of humanity and the ethical implications of that fact were universally recognized, there would be more war; peace conferences alone would be ineffectual. In 1920 He wrote: “The Hague Conference held before the war had as its President the Emperor of Russia, and its members were men of the greatest eminence. Nevertheless, this did not prevent such a terrible war. Now how will it be? For in the future another war, fiercer than the last, will assuredly break out; verily, of this there is no doubt whatever.”83‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Selections, 228.2. And indeed, the Second World War would not only see more devastation and death than the First, but also the weaponizing of the “stupendous force” about which ‘Abdu’l-Bahá had warned Minister Arakawa, and its use against his own country.

Was there anything that Bahá’u’lláh, a religious prisoner in a remote backwater of the Ottoman Empire, writing seven years before Becquerel’s discovery of radioactivity, could have said to audiences of the nineteenth century—or ‘Abdu’l-Bahá to those of the early twentieth (even to a representative of the government of Japan)—not merely to warn against war but to prove the existence and nature of atomic energy in a way that would have made them understand the wisdom of the warnings and take action to prevent the catastrophic consequences? In November 1918 ‘Abdu’l-Bahá wrote to a Bahá’í in Iran that He had warned the people of the West: 

The entire continent of Europe hath become an arsenal for arms and munitions waiting for a spark to kindle the flame of war and make the planet earth tremble…. But as the wise Saná’í saith: ‘To speak of the subtleties of Saná’í before the foolish and the weak of mind / Is like plucking the lute for the deaf or holding a mirror to the blind.’ Thus all that should not have happened did happen and still the wayward people were not awakened or guided aright. Neither signs nor warners avail them.84‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Tablet dated 2 Rajab 1337 [3 April 1919] to an individual, Bahá’í World Centre Archives, Haifa, Israel (provisional translation). Almost as if in response, in 1922 Frederick Soddy said, “The catastrophe which has recently engulfed the world has, however, not been without its own intellectual renaissance.… at least, perhaps not all of us are now totally blind to the dangers ahead, or to the need of that impersonal but remorseless re-examination of the foundations of society, which Science has already applied to the mechanism of the physical universe” (Frederick Soddy, Banquet Speech, 11 February 2026, NobelPrize.org, nobelprize.org/prizes/chemistry/1921/soddy/speech/).

And whatever rational explanations or reasoned arguments might have been offered would also have been futile because a context within which the warning—or even the proof—could have made sense, much less be properly appreciated, did not yet exist.

In fact, in an even earlier reference to the strange and astonishing phenomenon of the power concealed within the atom, written in 1881—eight years before Words of Paradise—Bahá’u’lláh had made that very point:

          Every soul hath been and will ever remain incapable of comprehending the inmost essence of divine wisdom. Understanding is in truth the most great sign in the human soul…. However, we observe that, notwithstanding his excellent rank and exalted position, man is unable to comprehend the reality of most things, for understanding is dependent upon the power of vision. If the eye doth not see the palm tree, the mind cannot comprehend the world of fruits, leaves, trees, branches, and twigs enfolded in the seed. How could the mind, before observing it, comprehend that a thing existeth in the world, a particle of which would consume the whole world, reduce it to ashes, and completely obliterate it?85Bahá’u’lláh, Tablet dated 17 Rajab 1298 (15 June 1881) to several individuals, Bahá’í World Centre Archives, Haifa, Israel. I am grateful to Omid Ghaemmaghami for bringing this passage to my attention.

By Maximillian Afnan

Maximillian Afnan is a political theorist and Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His research examines the normative principles that underpin the operation of international institutions and the structure of the global order.

A central tenet of the Bahá’í perspective on history is that humanity has reached the point at which a lasting global peace is “not only possible but inevitable.”1Universal House of Justice, The Promise of World Peace (Bahá’í World Centre, 1985), bahai.org/r/981833506. Yet if peace is indeed inevitable, the path towards it has been neither straightforward nor uninterrupted. The twentieth century witnessed the establishment of unprecedented institutions of international cooperation, accompanied, at certain moments, by shifts in political culture and public consciousness that seemed to signify a new era in international relations. However, from a vantage point a quarter of the way through the twenty-first century, it is clear that the project of building a united and effective global order is far from complete, and indeed in some respects appears to be in reverse. As the Universal House of Justice observes: 

For many decades following the second great war of the twentieth century, humanity moved, with fits and starts, toward the promise of a united world. The failure to complete the project of the unification of nations, however, left gaps in relations in which supranational problems could fester and threaten the security and well-being of peoples and states, leading to a recrudescence of prejudice, of divers expressions of factionalism, and of virulent nationalism that are the very negation of Bahá’u’lláh’s message of peace and oneness.2Letter written on behalf of the Universal House of Justice to an individual, 27 April 2017, bahai.org/r/362945323.

Within this political and historical context, this article explores two questions. First, why did previous attempts to reach for lasting peace not succeed? Second, what conceptual and moral shifts stand between humanity and this long-cherished goal? If the obstacles to peace were merely technical or institutional, they might have been overcome long ago. The persistence of conflict and division suggests that a deeper transformation is required. What might be among the fundamental adjustments necessary for the establishment of a durable peace?

Reaching for Peace

In a message dated 18 January 2019, the Universal House of Justice comments on the progress towards world peace that has been made over the past century, and analyzes some of the causes of the regressive steps of recent years. In the letter, the House of Justice identifies three moments in which mankind seemed to be “reaching for real, lasting peace, albeit always falling short”: the two periods immediately following the First and Second World Wars, and the post-Cold War period.3Letter of the Universal House of Justice to the Bahá’ís of the world, 18 January 2019, bahai.org/r/276724432. The first moment saw the establishment of the League of Nations after the First World War. This represented the earliest attempt at a global collective security mechanism in history, and was accompanied in the 1920s by treaties and statements from intergovernmental meetings that explicitly rejected war as an instrument of foreign policy—a novel development in international relations at the time.4These included the Locarno treaties and the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact which explicitly renounced war “as an instrument of national policy.” See avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kbpact.asp. Tragically, of course, the League of Nations was hampered from birth by the non-participation of the United States, and by the harsh settlement imposed on the defeated powers from the First World War, sowing the seeds of resentment that would ignite a second global conflict two decades later.

The second attempt at peace initially appeared more promising. The United Nations and the series of accompanying economic institutions established in the wake of the Second World War were broader-based in their membership, and were accompanied by advances at the level of thought and political culture, with the creation and ratification of foundational agreements related to human rights and international law. What is interesting to note about this period is not only the list of institutions that were established, or the treaties signed, but the tenor of public discourse. During this period, following the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a wide range of scientists, political figures, jurists, journalists, and authors advocated for a world state powerful enough to prevent nuclear destruction. Albert Einstein, for example, conducted an extended publicity tour advocating for global government, while his colleagues on the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists lobbied for integrated global control of nuclear weapons.5Dexter Masters and Katharine Way, eds., One World or None (McGraw-Hill, 1946). Multiple resolutions introduced in the US Congress supported the creation of a world federation or transformation of the United Nations along world state lines, and major hearings on world government proposals were held by foreign affairs committees in both the US House and Senate in 1949 and 1950. Elsewhere, public support for a union of Atlantic democracies was expressed in 1949 by the foreign ministers of Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Belgium, as well as by the Canadian Senate.6Daniel Deudney, “Greater Britain or Greater Synthesis? Seeley, Mackinder, and Wells on Britain in the Global Industrial Era,” Review of International Studies 27, no. 2 (2001): 187–208, jstor.org/stable/2009772. In India, Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru made a world federal government central to the 1942 Quit India Resolution, framing it as a remedy for Western imperialism.7Luis Cabrera, “Global International Relations and Indian Visions of World Government,” Global Studies Quarterly 5, no. 3 (2025), doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksaf061. Several organizations were founded in this period to draft a “world constitution.”8Joseph Preston Baratta, The Politics of World Federation (Praeger, 2004). World federalism drew support not only from academic, scientific, economic, and political elites, but also from relatively broad cross-sections of the population (at least in surveyed countries). In June 1946, for example, a Gallup poll asked Americans: “Do you think the United Nations Organization should be strengthened to make it a world government with power to control the armed forces of all nations, including the United States?” The results showed 54% in favor and 24% opposed, with the remainder undecided.9Luis Cabrera, “World Government: Renewed Debate, Persistent Challenges,” European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 3 (2010): 511–30. Indeed, similar surveys across the period 1946-1949 showed substantial American support for strengthening the United Nations into a world government, with approval ratings ranging from 52-77%. One reason to highlight this example is that the US is now one of the countries where respondents are more skeptical than the global average regarding the desirability of world government.

If nothing else, these examples illustrate that the terrain of public discourse is not fixed and that what appear to be immovable boundaries in public opinion, or hard constraints of political possibility, can, and indeed do, change dramatically over time. In the case of the mid-century postwar moment, however, this upsurge in discourse around world government receded as attempts to strengthen global government, notably in response to the threat of nuclear war, failed in an atmosphere of growing tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result, political, scholarly, and public attention drifted away from the idea and remained largely dormant until the end of the Cold War.

Full-page promotion in The New York Times (1918-12-25) by The League to Enforce Peace, promoting formation of a League of Nations.

The Third Moment

The third moment of reaching for peace stands much closer to our present historical juncture. During the 1990s there was a significant expansion in the range and strength of systems designed to foster international cooperation, exemplified by a series of conferences on thematic issues organized under the auspices of the UN, various developments in the area of international law including the adoption of the Rome statute leading to the creation of the International Criminal Court, and the formulation of the Millennium Development Goals. These political developments were matched by an upsurge in scholarly attention to the question of global governance (and the emergence of this term in common academic parlance).10Thomas Weiss charts how the notion of “global governance” came to displace the language of “world government” in academic and policy discourse. See Thomas G. Weiss, “What Happened to the Idea of World Government,” International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 2 (2009): 253–71, jstor.org/stable/27735096.

Alongside the political optimism of the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, a prominent feature of intellectual discourse at the time was the assumption that an expanded global order would consist largely in the progressive extension of the achievements of the modern West around the world. Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis was totemic of this assumption. Fukuyama argued that following the collapse of Soviet communism liberal democratic capitalism had emerged as the final form of human government, with no viable ideological competitors remaining.11Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, 1992). Fukuyama illustrates the tenor of public and scholarly discourse at the time. His argument is more sophisticated than saying that the West had simply “won” the Cold War—he provides a Hegelian argument that liberal democracy is uniquely attractive because it best satisfies fundamental human desires for recognition and dignity. Further, he does not claim that countries will inevitably become liberal democracies, only that it has no serious competitors as a normatively compelling philosophical position. Proposals for reforming political order in this period were thus often proposals for globalizing aspects of the economic and political model of the West.12Strobe Talbott, “America Abroad: The Birth of the Global Nation,” Time, 20 July 1992; David Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Polity Press, 1995); Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton University Press, 1993). In a 2005 Bahá’í World article, Michael Karlberg notes that critique of free-market capitalism is relatively widespread, including by voices within the West, but that the same has not hitherto been true of liberal democracy. The article goes on to analyze some of the limitations and pathologies of liberal democratic governance, including tendencies towards polarization, gridlock, oligarchic capture of political processes, and rising cynicism. See Michael Karlberg, “Western Liberal Democracy as New World Order?” The Bahá’í World (2005), bahaiworld.bahai.org/library/western-liberal-democracy-as-new-world-order/.

Yet against the optimism of many who assumed that liberal democracy would inexorably suffuse political systems worldwide, the first two decades of the twenty-first century have seen a series of cross-cutting trends that have undermined this narrative, and which seem to have eroded faith in the very idea of international governance. In some parts of the world, a “globalization backlash” has been expressed in phenomena such as member states withdrawing from international organizations and agreements, increasing trade protectionism, and more general protests against international institutions.13Stefanie Walter, “The Backlash Against Globalization,” Annual Review of Political Science 24 (2021): 421–42, doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041719-102405. These currents of dissatisfaction draw on a wide and sometimes contradictory range of sources—from populist nationalisms, to movements with anti-capitalist orientations, to postcolonial critiques centered on historical marginalization. Underlying many of these phenomena is a general concern that the structures and ideologies underpinning globalization serve only a small minority of the world’s population. Alongside these political developments, this period has also seen growing scholarly interest in marginalized traditions of thought, often with the goal of unmasking the “false universalism” of dominant liberal thought.14Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton University Press, 2000). Efforts to imagine an effective and legitimate global order have thus come to be constrained within the terms of an unpalatable dichotomy—between a “globalism” that embraces liberalism and free-market capitalism as its foundation and an “anti-globalism” that is suspicious of the very idea of a global order. Such suspicion reflects not only disillusionment with the prevailing model of globalization, but broader anxieties about cultural homogenization and the global concentration of power.

While social and intellectual trends have raised questions about the direction of globalization, the inherently cross-national challenges for which global institutions are designed have hardly disappeared. If anything, their intensity has grown. In the juxtaposition of these trends lies a key paradox. On the one hand, the forces propelling global integration are strengthening, and with them the necessity of global cooperation. On the other, consensus around the basis for a legitimate global order is eroding.

A Fundamental Prerequisite

Where, then, do we go from here? The vision of global integration built on liberal democratic capitalism has been criticized for its tendency to universalize particular political, cultural, and economic arrangements that themselves have not proven able to establish social harmony or justice, while a reactive skepticism of the entire project of building a unified world order offers no constructive path forward in the face of inherently transnational challenges. Neither pole offers a satisfactory response to the challenges humanity faces. The task, therefore, is twofold: to separate the notion of a unified global order from the simple extension of the methods and procedures of liberal democracy or market capitalism, and to move beyond solely critiquing a defective order by describing, with progressive clarity, what might take the place of the present “incomplete project” of the unification of nations.

Where might such an alternative foundation be identified? Each of the three historical moments examined above saw genuine advances in the machinery of international cooperation, yet none succeeded in establishing enduring peace. The post-Cold War period, in particular, demonstrated that even substantial institutional development proves insufficient when underlying questions about the nature and purpose of global society remain unresolved. The resulting dichotomy between globalism and anti-globalism reflects, at a deeper level, an absence of shared conviction about the foundations of human society capable of commanding broad allegiance. What appears to be missing are not only better mechanisms of coordination, but rather a conception of global society itself, one that can ground institutional arrangements in globally shared principles.

In examining Bahá’í contributions to public discourse on the question of peace, one idea stands out as a central conviction regarding both what is defective in the existing global order and what is required for the elusive goal of global peace and stability to be realized: the principle of the oneness of humanity. The principle not only informs visions of a future world civilization whose contours can scarcely be imagined, but also stands at the heart of contributions to contemporary discourse about what is to be done here and now.

In a statement marking the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, for example, the Bahá’í International Community draws attention to the “profound convictions for our collective behaviour” that flow from the truth that “the human family is one.”15Bahá’í International Community, A Governance Befitting: Humanity and the Path Toward a Just Global Order (2020), bic.org/statements/governance-befitting-humanity-and-path-toward-just-global-order. The statement observes that the challenge of embedding the principle of oneness in the design and operation of the global order is not merely one of creating or reforming institutions, important as this is. Rather, there exists a pressing need for what the statement terms a “settled consensus” around “a set of common values and principles” capable of underpinning collective decision-making on issues affecting humanity as a whole.16Bahá’í International Community, A Governance Befitting. The Promise of World Peace, a 1985 message of the Universal House of Justice to the peoples of the world, similarly expresses this conviction, identifying the primary question confronting humanity as “how the present world, with its entrenched pattern of conflict, can change to a world in which harmony and cooperation will prevail.” Its answer: “World order can be founded only on an unshakable consciousness of the oneness of mankind….” Accepting the oneness of humanity, the message continues, represents “the first fundamental prerequisite for reorganization and administration of the world as one country, the home of humankind.”17Universal House of Justice, Promise of World Peace.

Yet what is meant by “oneness” in these contexts? And how does the principle of oneness take us beyond the familiar principles and institutions of the current discourse on global governance? Shoghi Effendi states:

The principle of the Oneness of Mankind—the pivot round which all the teachings of Bahá’u’lláh revolve—is no mere outburst of ignorant emotionalism or an expression of vague and pious hope. Its appeal is not to be merely identified with a reawakening of the spirit of brotherhood and good-will among men, nor does it aim solely at the fostering of harmonious cooperation among individual peoples and nations.18Shoghi Effendi, The World Order of Bahá’u’lláh (Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1938), bahai.org/r/449204500.

In exploring the meaning of oneness, it is important to begin from the recognition that it would be premature to claim to comprehend anything but a fraction of its full import for the life of humanity. Clarity on what the principle of oneness entails for the next stage of social evolution will only emerge through sustained processes of learning and exploration. The full significance of the principle—including its implications for human consciousness and the very foundations of social existence—extends well beyond what any single line of inquiry can capture. The principle carries implications for many dimensions of social life, including questions of identity, the relations between diverse peoples and groups, the organization of economic life, and collective governance.19The implications of oneness for questions of identity—how we define ourselves and relate to others—have received insightful treatment recently in the pages of The Bahá’í World. See Shahrzad Sabet, “The Crisis of Identity,” The Bahá’í World, bahaiworld.bahai.org/library/the-crisis-of-identity/. This analysis follows the observation of the House of Justice in its message of 18 January 2019, that one obstacle to peace is humanity’s present “crisis of identity, as various peoples and groups struggle to define themselves, their place in the world, and how they should act.” Indeed, the promise of a global order grounded in oneness may extend beyond the achievement of more stable and just governance arrangements. As relationships among peoples are progressively reordered to reflect the reality of oneness, new horizons of possibility may emerge that cannot be anticipated at present. With all this in mind, and conscious of the constraints of inevitably limited vision, there is one particular idea this essay seeks to examine because of its relevance to current questions of political life and global order: what the concept of oneness tells us about the nature of society itself.

Conceptions of Society

Underlying most political and philosophical thought are conceptual models or metaphors which, though not literal descriptions of reality, generate distinctive conceptions of the body politic. One thinks of the market as a jungle in classical economics, the Confucian image of the extended family as a model for political relationships, or Plato’s image of the city-state as a ship requiring a wise captain. Such heuristic devices organize ideas and shape intuitions regarding the moral principles that ought to govern collective life, which in turn mold social norms and structures.

Of these various images, we can examine one in some depth as an example of how a guiding metaphor can shape the architecture of an entire tradition of political thought. The image of a social contract conceptualizes society as a collection of individuals who, despite divergent interests and beliefs, form a binding agreement to regulate social and political questions arising among them. This contract sets certain ground rules for ongoing coexistence and serves as a reference point in arbitrating disputes about what individuals owe to one another. From this deceptively simple starting point flow distinctive assumptions about persons, about what justice requires, and about the proper role of political institutions, assumptions that have also informed influential approaches to theorizing social and global order.

John Rawls’s influential theory of justice provides an instructive example of how this contractualist vision generates a framework of political principles. Rawls is a particularly helpful figure because he explicitly notes that conceptions of justice are “the outgrowth of different notions of society.”20John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 9–10. Rawls begins with a fundamental organizing conception of society as a system of cooperation between autonomous and equal individuals. He then creates the device of an “original position,” a hypothetical scenario in which parties deliberate about the terms of the social contract—the basic terms of social cooperation between them—while deprived of knowledge about morally arbitrary characteristics about themselves, such as their race, class, gender, or natural talents.

The original position serves as the mechanism for working out what free and equal individuals would agree to under conditions that model fairness. Parties in the original position are characterized by “mutual disinterest”—they are concerned with advancing their own conception of the good, but are not motivated by benevolence toward or envy of others. This assumption is not incidental: it ensures that the principles chosen are ones that individuals can accept as fair regardless of their particular conceptions of human flourishing or moral doctrines, and it models the separateness of persons that Rawls takes to be a basic fact about human beings.21Rawls is careful to distinguish between the motivation of parties in the original position and the motivation of actual persons, noting that mutual disinterest is a modeling device rather than a claim about human nature. He argues that the combination of mutual disinterest and the veil of ignorance achieves much the same purpose as benevolence, since it forces each party to take the good of others into account. See Rawls, Theory of Justice, pp. 128–29. This defense succeeds against the charge that his theory presupposes egoism. However, the choice to model fairness through mutually disinterested parties carries with it assumptions about the independent specifiability of agents’ interests that sit in tension with the idea of constitutive interdependence discussed later in this article. The framework treats others’ positions as possible locations for oneself, rather than recognizing that one’s own flourishing depends on the character of shared structures and relationships regardless of which position in society one occupies. From this architecture flows Rawls’s principles of justice. The first principle guarantees equal basic liberties for all citizens—freedoms such as political participation, expression, and conscience that rational agents would not risk losing regardless of their position in society. The second principle addresses social and economic inequalities, requiring that positions of advantage be open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, and that any remaining inequalities work to the benefit of the least advantaged members of society.22John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Harvard University Press, 1999). Each element follows from what mutually disinterested parties, ignorant of their own circumstances, would rationally choose: they would secure fundamental freedoms, ensure fair access to opportunities, and, since they might find themselves among the worst off, insist that inequalities improve the prospects of those worst-off in society.

Rawls’s theory represents one example of sophisticated and nuanced contractualist thinking, which in many ways is sensitive to the balance of unity and diversity in society. The purpose here is not to criticize it, but rather to demonstrate that any such framework relies on a particular image of human nature and social order. The characterization of agents in this framework as mutually disinterested, the specification of interests prior to and independent of social relationships, and the modeling of fair agreement as that which emerges from a process of individual rational choice all form, and reinforce the notion that an individual’s core interests are understood to be independently constituted, and that social cooperation is merely an arrangement among such agents to secure fair terms despite potentially divergent interests. Importantly, the effects of contractualist thinking, of which Rawls’s view is one illustrative example, have not been confined to the academy. In direct and indirect ways, this conceptual model, which emerged during the Enlightenment and remains influential in contemporary political thought, has become embedded in the political, economic, and social lives of whole societies. Consider Rawls’s principles of justice. His first principle, guaranteeing equal basic liberties, finds expression in the broader liberal commitment that individual freedom can only be constrained in order to prevent harm to others.23It should be noted that several of the principles discussed here, including the harm principle, also have roots in non-contractualist liberal thought, such as the work of J. S. Mill. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (John W. Parker and Son, 1859). The purpose of the present analysis is not to claim that the social contract tradition is the sole source of these principles, but to illustrate how a particular conception of society can underpin and give coherence to a framework of political thought. The assumption of mutual disinterest, which ensures that principles are acceptable regardless of one’s particular conception of the good, underwrites the notion that the state should remain neutral between different visions of the good life rather than promoting any substantive account of human flourishing. And the architecture of the original position, modeling society as separate individuals who must find terms of cooperation despite divergent interests, reflects the prevalent belief that governance structures and social institutions exist primarily to arbitrate between potentially divergent claims rather than to cultivate shared purposes. These and similar principles have over time become codified in constitutional documents, embedded in popular consciousness, and expressed in legal precedent.

The point is not that such principles lack merit. It is rather that they emerge from a particular conception of society and the person. When this contractualist framework is extended to theorize global order, the parties sometimes shift from individuals to states, such that global society is conceptualized as a system populated by free (i.e. autonomous) and equal (i.e. sovereign) nation-states.24There have been a number of attempts to extend the Rawlsian picture of society to equivalent analysis of the global order, with some authors, such as Charles Beitz, attempting to extend the domestic Rawlsian original position by depriving parties of knowledge of their nationality, while others, including Rawls himself, prefer to conceptualize global society as a system of cooperation between “peoples” or societies rather than between individuals, generating principles of international order that emphasize national self-determination. See Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton University Press, 1979); John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard University Press, 1999). But core elements of the underlying conception remain: separate agents with divergent interests seeking mutually acceptable terms of cooperation. Beyond explicitly nationalist or statist extensions of the contractualist conception of society, if building a just and effective global order consisted, as many assumed in the post-Cold War period, in extending the Western social and political model worldwide, it would involve globalizing something like the contractual conception of society, embedding its assumptions about persons and social cooperation in political cultures and institutions around the world.

The purpose of the analysis above has simply been to make visible assumptions that often operate invisibly—to show that the contractual framework represents one possible starting point among others, not a neutral or inevitable foundation for political thought. This recognition opens space to ask what a conception of society informed by the principle of oneness might look like, and how it might differ from the models that currently predominate.

Oneness and Global Society

With this in mind, let us return to the idea of oneness. A conception of society, including global society, as a cooperative system characterized by an essential oneness would emphasize the extent and nature of interdependence between its constituent elements, in both an empirical and a normative sense. The empirical aspect observes that the well-being of individuals and societies is connected across borders, whether through economic systems, ecological processes, technological networks, or political structures.25While the focus here is the global level, this interdependence characterizes social reality at every scale—within communities and nations as much as between them. Yet the conception is not merely descriptive. The normative component asserts that these empirical interdependencies possess constitutive rather than merely instrumental significance for human flourishing. This normative dimension transcends enlightened self-interest, which would calculate the long-term advantages of cooperation while maintaining that agents affect one another’s well-being only instrumentally, and approaches that widen the scope of moral obligation while leaving the underlying conception of agents and their interests unchanged. Constitutive interdependence makes a stronger claim and implies a transformed understanding of what constitutes interest and well-being themselves: one’s capacity to flourish is inherently limited when others suffer. This is not simply because their suffering might eventually affect one’s interests from the outside, but because flourishing itself is partly constituted by the character of one’s relationships and the health of shared structures. To put the point positively, participation in relationships of genuine reciprocity and shared endeavor may unlock, or even itself constitute, a dimension of flourishing that no degree of isolated prosperity can provide.

Each conception of society carries with it an implicit or explicit view of the person—what agents are like, what motivates them, and what constitutes their flourishing. A contractualist conception would generally assume agents whose interests can be specified independently. A conception informed by oneness, by contrast, is likely to assume that agents’ capacity for flourishing is inherently relational. Human flourishing, on this view, inherently involves the quality of relationships and systemic conditions, not merely the accumulation of goods, the satisfaction of preferences, or even access to resources and the protection of basic rights, important as these are. From this perspective, the quality of social structures partially determines individual possibilities, and societal dysfunction constrains human flourishing even for those who appear temporarily insulated.

Understanding oneness in this way—as a principle informing our conception of global society—carries significant implications. If the capacity to flourish cannot be isolated from the health of shared structures and relationships, neither can peace; and this reframes conventional thinking about what peace requires, in terms of both scope and sequence. Regarding scope, it helps to explain the claim in The Promise of World Peace that achieving peace requires removing obstacles often seen as unrelated to peace: “…the abolition of war is not simply a matter of signing treaties and protocols; it is a complex task requiring a new level of commitment to resolving issues not customarily associated with the pursuit of peace.”26Universal House of Justice, Promise of World Peace. If oneness informs our foundational conception of society, then obstacles to peace such as racism, wealth inequality, tribal nationalism, and religious sectarianism are not discrete problems to be addressed separately. They are incompatible with oneness and therefore with a society capable of genuine peace; conceptualizing social order through the lens of oneness illuminates why these diverse phenomena share a common root. Regarding sequence, oneness reveals the limitations of the assumption that unity is “a distant, almost unattainable ideal to be addressed only after a host of political conflicts have been somehow resolved”: oneness is not the fruit of solving other problems; it is the prerequisite for solving them.27Bahá’í International Community, Who Is Writing the Future? Reflections on the Twentieth Century (1999), bahai.org/documents/bic-opi/who-writing-future.

A conception of society informed by oneness, like its contractual counterpart, would not be a mere abstraction, but would carry significant practical consequences. As the discussion of Rawls illustrated, conceptions of society inform the normative principles selected to regulate collective life, which in turn shape laws, policies, and institutions. Such a conception of global society would carry with it similarly distinctive implications, both empirical and normative.

The empirical dimension directs attention to the ways in which the major challenges defining contemporary global politics demonstrate this inherent interdependence. Climate change is one clear example: no amount of national wealth can insulate a society from atmospheric changes driven by global emissions. Similarly, pandemic preparedness, financial stability, and digital technologies create vulnerabilities that transcend national boundaries and cannot be addressed through isolated action. These are not marginal issues but increasingly define the parameters within which all other political and economic activity occurs. The principle of oneness also enables us to distinguish between narrow material accumulation and comprehensive flourishing. An individual or society might increase certain metrics—household wealth, GDP, territorial control—while experiencing degradation in the broader conditions that enable genuine well-being. Rising wealth inequality in many countries coinciding with deepening polarization and weakening social trust suggests that even apparent beneficiaries of economic inequality bear costs in other dimensions of life.28Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better (Allen Lane, 2009); Eric M. Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust (Cambridge University Press, 2002).

The normative dimension carries distinctive implications for what ought to be done about these interdependencies. Enlightened self-interest might recognize that assisting developing nations creates future markets or that environmental cooperation prevents future costs. But the idea of constitutive interdependence suggested by oneness makes a stronger and qualitatively different claim: one’s capacity to flourish cannot be separated from the flourishing of others within a system of social cooperation, because the quality of shared structures and relationships is not merely an external condition affecting well-being but partly constitutive of it. Appealing to oneness to justify and appraise laws or policies may imply, among other things, that the legitimacy of domestic policies be judged by reference to their global impacts and that self-interested bargaining in global politics represents not merely a moral failure but a fundamental misunderstanding of a nation’s own interests.29See Bahá’í International Community, A Governance Befitting. A central bank’s mandate, for instance, would be framed not purely in domestic terms but in terms of contributing to the stability and health of the international economic system, recognizing this as a condition of its own society’s prosperity.30Empirical evidence suggests, for example, that increases in US interest rates trigger economic effects of at least the same size in a significant number of foreign countries, as the effect in the US itself. See Matteo Iacoviello and Gaston Navarro, “Foreign Effects of Higher U.S. Interest Rates,” Journal of International Money and Finance 95 (2019): 232–50. Agricultural support policies would be designed to strengthen food systems both domestically and internationally—asking not only whether subsidies benefit domestic producers, but whether they contribute to food security worldwide and to the livelihoods of farming communities in other countries.31Bahá’í International Community, Just, Sustainable and Resilient Food Systems: Some Considerations for the AU–EU Partnership (June 28, 2023), bic.org/publications/just-sustainable-and-resilient-food-systems. Tax regimes would be oriented toward building the shared fiscal capacity to fund public goods in every country, rather than structured in ways that encourage nations to competitively undercut one another. In each case, a oneness-informed conception of international society does not merely add global well-being as an afterthought; it reframes the very question of what constitutes effective policymaking, directing attention not only to how outcomes are distributed but to the character of the relationships through which collective life is conducted.

A selection of some of the published versions of The Promise of World Peace. Clockwise from top: English, Tuvaluan, Kannada, Gujarati, Bengali, Sinhalese, Norwegian, Tswana, German, Afrikaans, Sesotho, Korean, Samoan, Turkish, New Zealand Maori, Arabic, Portuguese, Swahili, Spanish, Faroese.

Oneness beyond Collectivism

The foregoing has sought to articulate, in necessarily preliminary terms, what a conception of global society informed by oneness might involve and some of its implications. Yet for all its apparent relevance to the challenges of global order, such a conception of global society has not yet permeated political discourse, let alone become embedded in social structures. This is not to say the ideal of oneness is completely absent—one can identify latent expressions of the underlying sentiment in foundational international documents such as the UN Charter. Similarly, in the more diffuse realm of public consciousness, it is common to hear in discourse, from informal everyday conversation to formal statements in global forums, recognition that in matters of public health “no one is safe until everyone is safe,” or that on climate change “the world will succeed or fail as one.” All this notwithstanding, there are many aspects of the existing global political order that do not yet reflect, or align with, the implications of human oneness. Why might this be? Why has a conception of the essential nature of social order informed by oneness not been more widely adopted?

Clearly, one significant part of the answer is a gap between moral principle and action, and a lack of willingness to “put aside short-term self-interest” on the part of individuals, governing institutions, and indeed whole societies.32Letter of Universal House of Justice to the Bahá’ís of the world, 4 January 2022, bahai.org/r/845512230. But it would appear that insufficient commitment to recognized ideals is not all that is at work here. Sustained action in pursuit of moral principles is difficult without clarity about the kind of world those principles are meant to create. There are conceptual obstacles, at least in some prevalent traditions of thought, to embracing the reality of oneness as an essential characteristic of global society. These conceptual obstacles may, by furnishing rationales for behavior inconsistent with the principle of oneness, in turn weaken the connection between the force of moral principle and political practice. When, for instance, the separateness and divergent interests of nations is treated as a basic fact of international life, policies that prioritize narrow national advantage over global well-being appear not as moral failures but as rational responses to how the world is structured.

The conceptual concern regarding oneness, while not always articulated explicitly, can be presented as follows: conceptions of society that emphasize unity, including those which draw on organic metaphors (such as the use of the human body analogy in the Bahá’í writings), have historically been deployed in service of worldviews emphasizing hierarchy, homogeneity, or the priority of the collective over the individual. Karl Popper expresses the general intuition in contrasting the “closed” and “open” society: “the open society rests on a strong commitment to individualism—to individual rights but also to individual responsibilities—and on a rejection of the “organic theory” that prioritizes the collective (the tribe, the nation, etc.) over the individual.”33Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Routledge, 1945), pp. 165–66. 

Clearly, this is not what the principle of oneness from a Bahá’í perspective asserts. When the Bahá’í writings make reference to the human body as a model for social relationships, this is not an understanding of the body as simply an agglomeration of interchangeable cells, whose individual character is unimportant, but rather a complex web of interdependent systems, which requires the complementary operation of differentiated components.34Further, metaphors should not be confused with descriptions of reality in and of itself. Society is not, in fact, a human body, any more than it is a contractual agreement. Such metaphors are tools that attempt to approximate certain of reality’s features for the purposes of illuminating principles relevant to social organization. Their value is demonstrated by the fecundity of the traditions of thought derived from them over time, rather than by simplistic statements about their inevitable consequences. Extending the metaphor to social organization, diversity in political cultures and institutional arrangements enables experimentation with different governance approaches, creating opportunities for learning about distinctive knowledge and practices suited to varied contexts. Further, collectivism, in problematic forms, treats society as a unified agent possessing a single system of desire, a collective entity whose judgments and purposes override or subsume individual perspectives. A oneness-inspired conception of society need not make any such claim. It would make quite a different point: that pursuing self- or national interest in ways that systematically undermine global structures or the flourishing of other segments of society represents a misunderstanding of the conditions for one’s own flourishing.

Unreflective identification of ideals of interdependence or social unity with crude collectivism, then, may help to explain why a conceptualization of global society that emphasizes its essential oneness has not been the object of greater attention. Attempts to examine the potential of conceptual models other than those dominant within the liberal tradition have perhaps been hampered by the persistence of false dichotomies. The tendency to present social organization as a binary choice between collectivism and individualism, or between liberalism and authoritarianism, may be one conceptual obstacle that needs to be overcome.

Crisis and Possibility

The foregoing analysis of twentieth-century attempts to establish peace suggests that moments of crisis often precipitate a reexamination of inadequate frameworks. Conceptions of society exert a profound influence on the intuitions, norms, and structures that shape collective life. Yet fundamental shifts in how society is understood are rarely the product of conceptual argument alone. Liberal models of social organization, for example, emerged through an interplay between philosophical reflection and the social and political action of particular groups and movements. As they form, such conceptions become embedded not only in formal structures but in popular consciousness, social norms, and everyday relationships. It follows that the process of developing a new underlying basis for global order will necessarily involve the efforts of communities and peoples in diverse settings to explore what oneness means for patterns of social organization—efforts that will, over time, generate insights and demonstrate possibilities capable of informing broader discourse and institutional change. In this sense, every segment of the world’s population has agency in the process of redefining the conceptual foundations of global society.

While the immediate prospects for peace are uncertain, the historical record also demonstrates how dramatic shifts in the landscape of political possibility can and do occur. It is not possible to predict how the integrative and disintegrative forces shaping humanity’s trajectory towards peace will unfold in the near future. Yet if enduring peace requires not only institutional arrangements but a conception of global society capable of grounding them, the work of clarifying what oneness implies for our collective life may be indispensable to the peace humanity seeks.

The author is grateful to Vafa Ghazavi, Shahrzad Sabet, and Stephen Agahi-Murphy for their input.